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Leigh et al.: Article VII of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence Witnesses

COMMENTS
ARTICLE VI OF THE WYOMING RULES OF EVIDENCE:
WITNESSES
Article VI of the recently adopted Wyoming Rules of Evidence deals with the subject of witnesses and the evidentiary
rules and procedures which govern witnesses at trials and hearings. It is patterned after and largely follows Article VI of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. However, several changes have
been made from the Federal Rules for use in Wyoming. One
of the purposes of this Comment is to explore and analyze
those changes. This Comment also relates the practice in
Wyoming prior to the adoption of Article VI and attempts to
show how that practice will be different under the new rules
and how significant the changes are likely to be.
RULE

601: GENERAL RULE OF COMPETENCY

1

Introduction and Scope
The purpose of Rule 601 is to eliminate all grounds rendering persons incompetent to testify not specifically recognized in the other rules. The modem philosophy is that few
persons are incapable of testifying in a manner that is at least
potentially useful to the trier of fact. 2 Thus, any person is
competent to testify as an ordinary witness unless there is insufficient evidence to show personal knowledge of the matter
involved (Rule 602); the witness refuses to take an oath or
affirmation to testify truthfully (Rule 603); he or she is the
presiding judge in the case (Rule 605); or he or she is a member of the jury hearing the case (Rule 606). Also, not all witnesses are competent to testify as experts under Rule 702
and Rule 703. Furthermore, Rule 601 does not prevent the
exclusion of witnesses upon relevancy concerns under Rule
401; or upon concerns of confusion, prejudice, or consumption of time pursuant to Rule 403.3
Copyright© 1978 by the University of Wyoming.
1. RULE 601. GENERAL RULE OF COMPETENCY
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in
these rules.
2. LOUISELL & MUELLER, 3 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 250 (forthcoming) [hereinafter
cited as LOUISELL & MUELLER].
3. Id. at § 252.
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Effect on Wyoming Law
The adoption of Rule 601 has varying effects on Wyoming statutes relating to competency. Section 1-12-101 of
the 1977 Wyoming Session Laws, 4 renumbering Section 1138 of the Wyoming Statutes, provided that all persons are
competent to testify except those of unsound mind and those
under ten years of age who appear incapable of receiving just
impressions of the facts on which they are examined. Despite
the statutory language of Section 1-12-101, and the fact that
Rule 1102 supercedes Section 1-12-101 the Rule 601 appears
to simply codify existing Wyoming case law. The Wyoming
Supreme Court in affirming a case finding a ten-year old child
competent to testify, stated that the trial judge must determine that the child be capable of receiving and remembering
just impressions of facts testified to, that she be able to relate
them intelligently and accurately, and that she possess a sense
of moral responsibility to tell the truth. Although the child
was prima facie competent to testify under the statute, the
court reasoned that if a child could meet the requirements,
he or she could testify regardless of his or her age.' Similarly,
the Wyoming Supreme Court has held a prosecutrix ten and
one-half years of age competent to testify. In addition to
being prima facie competent to testify, the court found the
witness was examined in the usual way about matters tending
to show she was a competent witness, and whether or not she
6
should testify was a matter of discretion for the trial judge.
Whereas the cases mentioned concern situations in which
the child was prima facie competent to testify the court indicated, in each case, children under ten would be competent
to testify if it was shown the child was capable of receiving
just impressions of the matters on which they are to testify
7
and the child understood the obligation to testify truthfully.
In United States v. Spoonhunter,8 a Tenth Circuit case, the
court in upholding a decision allowing a seven year old girl to
testify, found that although the Wyoming statute would not
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.

1977 WYO. SESS. LAWS Ch 12, § 1-12-101: All persons are competent witnesses except those of unsound mind and children under ten (10) years of age who appear
incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts and transactions on which they
are examined or of relating them truthfully.
Burt v. Burt, 48 Wvo. 19. 41 P.2d 524. 525 (1935).
Strand v. State, 36 Wyo. 78, 252 P. 1030 (1927); See also Gregg v. Gregg, 469 P.2d
406 (Wyo. 1970); State v. Franklin, 70 Wyo. 306, 249 P.2d 520 (1952).
State v. Franklin, supra note 6; Strand v. State, supra note 6.
476 F.2d 1051 (10th Cir. 1973).
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apply because the crime charged was a federal offense, there
was no inconsistency in the Wyoming statute and the federal
rule. The court stated that "the capacity of a person offered
as a witness is presumed, and in order to exclude a witness on
the grounds of mental incapacity, the existence of the incapacity must be made to appear." 9
It is therefore apparent, that even though Wyoming's statute was restrictive as to age, a child under ten would be competent to testify if the requisite criteria are met. Furthermore,
under previous Wyoming law, it was always in the discretion
of the trial judge whether or not a witness was competent to
testify. Obviously, Rule 601 terminates all age restrictions.
However, Rule 601 arguably should not preclude a judge
from excluding child witnesses if they are incapable of accurately relating the facts to which they are to testify or incapable of understanding the difference between truth and falsehood.
Under the early common law insane persons, idiots, and
inebriates were totally disqualified because the testimony of
such persons was considered completely untrustworthy. 10
Later, judges conducted inquiries as to the witness's competency, focusing on whether the witness had the capacity to
observe at the time of the event, to recollect the facts at the
time of the trial, and to testify so as to make himself understood. Eventually, although courts continued to insist upon
their right to exclude witnesses on grounds of incapacity, in
practice virtually all witnesses were allowed to testify." The
rationale is that a witness wholly without capacity would be
difficult to imagine, and that each witness's testimony should
2
be taken for what it seems to be worth.'
There have been no cases in Wyoming involving the issue
of whether a mentally deficient person is competent to testify. However, in a case involving a witness who used drugs the
Wyoming Supreme Court found that "the fact that the witness was an addict was a matter to be considered in connec9. Id. at 1054.
10.

WEINSTEIN & BERGER, 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
cited as WEINSTEIN].

11.

Id. at

12.

2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 493 (3d ed. 1940).

601 [04] (1976) [hereinafter

601 [04.]

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977

3

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 13 [1977], Iss. 3, Art. 6

912

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIII

tion with his credibility and the weight which should be given
to his testimony but not his competency."' 3
Rule 601 contains no provision requiring any measure of
mental capacity as a condition precedent to the giving of
testimony. However, it is at least arguable that under Rule
601, inquiry into the capacity of a witness, who is known to
be a user of drugs, to accurately observe, recollect, and recount is appropriate. Furthermore, courts should give instructions to the jury cautioning it to weigh the possible effect of
drug use upon the capacity of the witness.1 4 Under Rule 601
it is important to remember that factors such as age, psychological and mental disability, and use of drugs and alcohol
should be viewed as affecting the credibility of the witness
and not his competency.
There are several other Wyoming Statutes which deal indirectly with competency of witnesses. Although an extensive
analysis of these statutes is beyond the scope of this Comment, they do merit a brief discussion.
At common law persons were disqualified from testifying
if they possessed an interest in the case. Originally this restriction applied to parties in civil proceedings, defendants,
co-defendants, and co-indictees in criminal cases, and persons
other than parties, having an immediate legal interest in the
action. 15 This ground of incompetency is now abolished in
virtually all jurisdictions, including Wyoming. 6 Consequently,
Rule 601 merely codifies previous practice with respect to
interest. However, it is permissible to impeach a witness by
showing his interest in the proceeding. An exception to the
general rule on interest is the so-called Wyoming "Dead Man's
7
Statute". Section 1-12-102 of the 1977 Wyoming Statutes
13. Sims v. State, 496 P.2d 185,189 (Wyo. 1972).
14.

LOUISELL & MUELLER § 252.

15. WEINSTEIN at

601 [03].

16. WYO. STAT. § 1-12-103 (1977) provides in part: "[N] o person is disqualified as a
witness in any action, civil or criminal, because of his interest in the same as a party
or otherwise. Every person is a competent witness except as otherwise provided by
law, but his interest in the action may be shown to affect the credibility of the witness."
17. WYO. STAT. § 1-12-102 (1977): "In an action or suit by or against a person who
from any cause is incapable of testifying, or by or against a trustee, executor, administrator, heir or other representative of the person incapable of testifying, no
judgment or decree founded on uncorroborated testimony shall be rendered in
favor of a party whose interests are adverse to the person incapable of testifying or
his trustee, executor, administrator, heir or other representative. In any such action
or suit, if the adverse party testifies, all entries, memorandum and declarations by
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recodifies Section 1-140 of the 1957 Wyoming Statutes, 18
and is not superseded under Wyoming Rule of Evidence
1102. Section 1-12-103 substantially changes the old statute
and requires simply that no judgment founded on uncorroborated testimony may be rendered in favor of a party whose
interests are adverse to a person incapable of testifying. Furthermore, any declarations or memorandum made by the party incapable of testifying while he was competent may be received into evidence if it is relevant. Acts such as Section 112-103 are designed to prevent perjury or at least reflect a
policy of protecting decedent's estates and other parties unable to testify against fraudulent claims. Although this is a
viable reason for implementing the statute, such statutes
often cut off meritorious claims.'9 However, the "Dead Man's
Statute" has survived in Wyoming and is not affected by Rule
601.
Under the common law one spouse was incompetent to
testify for the other. The rationale was that the marital relation vested in both spouses an interest in the other's activities.
This disqualification has disappeared in practically all jurisdictions, including Wyoming. 2 Wyoming's law also provides
that no husband or wife shall be a witness against the other
except in criminal proceedings for a crime committed by 21one
against the other or in civil actions by one against the other.
In federal jurisdictions there is no indication of an intent
by Congress to limit or abolish the marital privilege by the
enactment of Rule 601,2 and correspondingly in Wyoming
there is no indication by the court that Rule 601 or Rule
50123 is to have any effect on the marital privilege. Similarly,
18.
19.
20.

21.

22.
23.

the party incapable of testifying made while he was capable, relevant to the matter
in issue, may be received in evidence."
WYO. STAT. § 1-12-102 (1977).
WEINSTEIN 9 601 [03] at 601-18.
Id. at 601-21; see also WYO. STAT. § 1-12-104 (1977); State v. Spears, 76 Wyo. 82,
300 P.2d 551, 562 (1956); (a husband and wife "[m]ay in all civil and criminal
cases be witnesses for each other the same as though the marital relation did not
exist. ").
WYO. STAT. § 1-12-104 (1977); see also Pike v. State 495 P.2d 1188, 1189 (Wyo.
1972); (Admission of wife's testimony in criminal cases where husband is defendant is error per se unless it is within the statutory exception, and circumstances
determine whether it is prejudicial.); Fox v. Fox, 75 Wyo. 390, 296 P.2d 252, 256
(1956); (One spouse, is incompetent to testify against the other irrespective of
whether testimony relates to a confidential communication, but duration of bar
against matters not confidential does not continue after termination of relationship).
LOUISELL & MUELLER § 252.
RULE 501. GENERAL RULE
Except as otherwise required by constitution or statute or by these or other
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the privilege of a witness,
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other privileges which survive include those covering communication between an attorney and his client, a doctor and
his patient, and a clergyman or priest concerning a confession
given to him in his professional character.2 '
Pursuant to the common law a person who has been convicted of treason, a felony, or an offense which involved
fraud or deceit was incompetent as a witness. 25 However, in
1918 the United States Supreme Court held that a former
conviction was no longer grounds for incompetency in criminal cases. 26 By 1953 all state jurisdictions had abolished use
of felony convictions to disqualify witnesses, although a few
jurisdictions hold conviction of perjury still renders a witness
incompetent. Wyoming takes the position that the conviction
for a felony will not render a witness incompetent, but it
does allow evidence of a prior conviction for impeachment
purposes and to test credibility. 27 (Future use of evidence of
conviction of a crime for impeachment purposes must comply with Wyoming Rule of Evidence 609 and is discussed at
length later in the article.) Thus, Rule 601 merely codifies existing Wyoming law in this area.
Conclusion
Competency is defined as the minimum standard of credibility necessary to permit any reasonable man to put any
credence in a witness's testimony. Thus, a witness must be
competent as to matters he is expected to testify about and
it is the court's obligation to insure witnesses meet the minimum standard.28 Furthermore, it is arguable that "Rule 601
should not preclude a judge from excluding certain witnesses
upon grounds closely akin to those underlying some of the
now discarded competency barriers. ' 29 Therefore, in rare
cases the trial judge might exclude a witness where severe incapacity subverts credibility to the point that questions of
basic relevance are raised or questions of prejudice or lack of
person, government, state, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the State
of Wyoming in the light of reason and experience.

24. WYo. STAT. § 1-12-101 (1977).
25. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 488 (3d ed. 1940).
26. Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918).
27.

Janski v. State, 538 P.2d 271 (1975); Heberling v. State 507 P.2d 1 (1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1022.

601 [01].
28. WEINSTEIN
29. LOUISELL & MUELLER § 252.
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personal knowledge become apparent. Finally, it suffices to
say, in light of the above-mentioned analysis, that Rule 601
renders everyone competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in the rules and, therefore, examination of individuals as to competency is no longer required unless it is
made to appear that minimum credibility is in doubt.
RULE

3
602: LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 0

General Provisions and Purpose
Wyoming Rule 602, which is identical to Federal Rule
602, requires each witness to have personal knowledge of
matters on which he is to testify. The necessary knowledge
may be shown by the testimony of the witness himself or by
extrinsic evidence. Hence, personal knowledge is not absolute,
but may consist of what the witness thinks he knows from
personal perception. The reference to Rule 703 was incorporated to avoid any question of conflict between Rule 602 and
the provisions of Rule 703 allowing an expert to express
opinions relying on facts of which he does not have personal
knowledge.31
The rule is an extension of the common law's insistence
that decisions be based on the best evidence available. It
therefore follows that personal knowledge actually means
firsthand knowledge which has come to the witness through
his own senses.3 The burden of laying a foundation by displaying the witness had personal knowledge, is on the party
offering the testimony. If the opposing party fails to object
for inadequate foundation he waives the preliminary proof,
however, if it later appears the witness lacked opportunity to
observe or did not actually observe the fact, his testimony
will be stricken.3
The personal knowledge requirement is closely related to
the hearsay doctrine and is based on the premise that "a wit30.

31.
32.
33.

RULE 602. LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient
to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to
prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness himself. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to opinion
testimony by expert witnesses.
FED. RULE EviD.602, Adv. Comm. Note.
LOUISELL & MUELLER § 259.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 10, at 21 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
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ness may testify to an event or occurrence which he has seen
himself, but not one which he knows only from the descripHowever, if a witness is to testify to outtion of others." '
of-court statements, whether or not the statement is admissible under the exceptions to the hearsay rules, the personal
knowledge requirement is satisfied if the witness has firsthand knowledge concerning the making or preparation of the
statement itself, regardless of his knowledge concerning the
events reported in the statement8 Although Rule 602 prevents witnesses from testifying to the subject matter of the
statement as he has no personal knowledge of it, Judge Weinstein reasons there is no inconsistency between Rule 602 and
the hearsay rules because the matters to which the witness is
testifying is what he heard rather than the event described by
the hearsay declarant 3 6
The effect of the language of Rule 602 is to compel admission of the witness's testimony if the proponent of the
evidence makes a prima facie showing of the qualifying characteristics. However, the judge retains the power to reject evidence if as a matter of law the trier of fact could not possibly
find the witness actually perceived the matter about which he
is testifying.Y
Despite the above-mentioned rule, the judge must admit
testimony even though the witness is not certain about what
he perceived, providing the witness had the opportunity to
observe and obtained some impressions from his observation.8 Thus a witness who has observed the matter in question with his own senses should be allowed to testify to what
he believes he saw although his testimony reflects uncertainty.9 Similarly, if reasonable men could differ as to whether
the witness had adequate opportunity to observe, then the
testimony of the witness should come in and the trier of fact
will evaluate the opportunity of the witness in reviewing the
testimony.4o It is worth noting that the nature of the matter
to be proved may require a sustained period of observation
by the witness to satisfy the personal knowledge require34. Supra note 32.
35. LOUISELL & MUELLER § 260.
602 [01] at 602-3.
36. WEINSTEIN
602 [02].
37. Id. at
38. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 658 (3d ed. 1940).
39. United States v. Evans, 484 F.2d 1178, 1181 (2d Cir. 1973).
40. MCCORMICK § 10, at 21.
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ment.41 For example, a longer period of observation would
be necessary to allow testimony concerning a person's insanity
or a personal view of character of another, than for most
other matters.
Rule 602 is also important because Rule 701, governing
opinion testimony by lay witnesses, incorporates the knowledge requirement of Rule 602. Therefore, when reading Rule
602 in conjunction with Rule 701 the witness before giving
his opinion is required first to have made observations supporting the opinion, and second to have reported the observation by giving as much data as possible. 42 The essential question, then, is whether the witness had an opportunity to observe facts upon which the opinion is based. If the above requirements are met the witness may then give opinion testimony if it is rationally based on the perception of the43witness
and helpful to a clear understanding of a fact in issue.
Effect on Wyoming Law
The Wyoming Supreme Court, in a case involving a witness
called to give the testimony of a deceased stated:
The rule is that it is sufficient if the witness is able to
state the substance of what was sworn on the former
trial. But, he must state in substance the whole of
the particular subject which he was
what was said on
44
called to prove.
Because the witness was unable to remember and did not undertake to state in substance all of the testimony of the deceased witness, he was incompetent to testify because he
lacked personal knowledge. Similarly, in Rosencrance v.
State15 a justice of the peace was held incompetent to testify
as to the testimony of another witness in a preliminary hearing, of which he was judge, in the absence of a showing that
he remembered the substance of the testimony.
These cases demonstrate that Wyoming required personal
knowledge by the witness on matters to which he is to testify
prior to the enactment of Rule 602.
41.

LOUISELL & MUELLER § 260.

42. WEINSTEIN

602 [03].

43.

Tait, The New Federal Rules of Evidence: A Summary of the Differences Between
the Rules and the ConnecticutLaw of Evidence, 9 CONN. L. REV. 1, 20 (1976).

44.
45.

Foley v. State, 11 Wyo. 464, 72 P. 627, 630 (1903).
33 Wyo. 360, 239 P. 952 (1925).
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RULE 603: OATH OR AFFIRMATION

46

General Provisions and Purpose
Wyoming Rule 603, which is identical to Federal Rule
603, requires that before a witness be allowed to testify he
must declare he will testify truthfully. The rule is designed to
afford flexibility in dealing with problems encountered in
swearing witnesses with unpopular religious beliefs or who
are atheists, agnostics, or conscientious objectors, and problems raised when the witness is mentally defective or a
a child. 47 The purpose of the rule is to further the cause of
truth by inducing in the witness a feeling of obligation to
speak only the truth and to impress upon the witness the
danger of criminal prosecution for perjury for deliberately
giving false testimony. 48 The rule will be satisfied by either
an oath, which invokes devine power, or an affirmation, which
is a solemn declaration. The oath or affirmation may be given
in any manner designed to impress the witness with the duty
to tell the truth.
If a witness fails to satisfy the requirement of the oath it
should be immediately brought to the attention of the trial
judge, because failure to object at the time that the witness
49
was not sworn will constitute a waiver of that objection.
At common law, athiests, agnostics, and children could
not testify, the rationale being that a pre-requisite of taking
an oath was belief in a devine being who would punish false
swearing."0 However, the modem trend has been to allow
witnesses to testify without any reference to religious belief.
Consequently, it has been held reversible error for a court to
refuse to let an accused testify because he would not take an
oath with God's name in it. 51 The court, emphasizing that
the common law did not require an appeal to God as a pre46.

47.
48.
49.

50.
51.

RULE 603: OATH OR AFFIRMATION
Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that he will testify
truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken his
conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so.
FED. RULE EVID. 603, Adv. Comm. Note.
LOUISELL & MUELLER § 265.
Thomas v. Dad's Root Beer & Canada Dry Bottling Co., 225 Ore. 116, 357 P.2d
418 (1960); State v. Doud, 190 Ore. 218, 225 P.2d 400 (1950); however, see U.S.
v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971), (in a situation where there is no opportunity
to object, for example, a proceeding before a grand jury, it is error even to question
a witness who refuses to take an oath).
MCCORMICK § 63, at 141.
United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1969).
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requisite to a valid oath, found the defendant's privilege to
testify may not be denied him because he would not accede
to a form of oath or affirmation not required by common
law.
As previously mentioned, another problem is the swearing of witnesses with unpopular religious beliefs. Because there
may be a tendency towards jury prejudice because of the
manner in which a witness chooses to be sworn, 52 the better
practice is to permit the witness to affirm and have any questions on the subject of his religion asked out of the presence
of the jury.5 This procedure would also be in accord with
Wyoming Rule 610 which provides that a witness cannot be
impeached on the basis of religious belief.
Effect on Wyoming Law
Although there are no relevant Wyoming cases concerned
with the validity of an oath or affirmation, Wyoming prior to
the adoption of Rule 603 enacted several statutes consistent
with the modem trend. Prior to 1977 Wyoming required a
specific verbal formula in administering an oath." However,
the statute has been superseded and replaced by Section 1-2101 of the 1977 Wyoming Statutes, which provides that a
person may be sworn by any form he deems binding on his
conscience. Section 1-2-103 of the Wyoming Statutes" allows for an affirmation in lieu of an oath to persons conscientiously opposed to taking an oath. And Wyoming Rule of
Civil Procedure 43(d) provides that when under the rules of
civil procedure an oath is required, an affirmation may be accepted in lieu thereof. It necessarily follows that the adoption of Rule 603 does very little to change pre-existing Wyoming law. Furthermore, there is no indication under Wyoming
Rule 11026 or any indication by the Wyoming court that
Rule 603 was to have any effect on the above-mentioned
statutes. Thus, Rule 603 appears to simply codify previous
Wyoming law.
52. LOUISELL & MUELLER § 266.
53. United States v. Rabb, 394 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1968).
54. WYO. STAT. 1-153 (1957).
55. See also WYO. STAT. § 1-2-102 (1977): Officers Authorized to Administer Oaths.
56. RULE 1102. STATUTES SUPERCEDED.
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RULE 604: INTERPRETERS 5 7
Introduction and General Provisions
Rule 604 provides specifically that an interpreter must
qualify as an expert in the skill of interpreting under Article
VII and make an oath or affirmation to translate truthfully.
The rule must be read in conjunction with Wyoming Rule of
Civil Procedure 43(f) and Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(b), both of which provide that the judge in his discretion may order the appointment and compensation of interpreters.
Whenever a party or witness utterly lacks the ability to
comprehend English, the service of an interpreter is essential
during litigation.5 8 Wigmore suggests that interpreters may be
used for three classes of persons: (1) persons organically unable to speak words; (2) persons speaking exclusively or more
naturally a language foreign to the tribunal; and (3) persons
unable, through diffidence or illness, to speak loud enough
for the tribunal to hear.5 9
Comprehension and fluency in both English and the foreign tongue is all that is required to qualify an interpreter,
the trial judge having discretion in assessing the interpreters
qualifications. 60 If the witness does not understand English
the better practice is to have the interpreter translate all that
is being said by the judge, attorney, and other witnesses. The
translated non-English version of matters never become part
of the court record, and for this reason the interpreter should
not edit or inject personal judgment or advice in the process
of relating what has transpired 61
Application of the Rule
The general rule, which is followed by Wyoming, 62 is that
whether or not an interpreter should be appointed is within
63
the discretion of the trial judge.
RULE 604. INTERPRETERS
An interpreter is subject to the provisions of these rules relating to qualification as an expert and the administration of an oath or affirmation that he will
make a true translation.
58. LOULSELL & MUELLER § 271.
59. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 811 (3d ed. 1940).
60. LOUISELL & MUELLER § 272.
61. Id- at § 271.
62. Casciato v. Rennick, 380 P.2d 122, 123 (Wyo. 1963); Thompkins v. Byrtus, 72
Wyo. 537, 267 P.2d 753, 756 (1954).
63. Fairbanks v. Cowan, 551 F.2d 97, 99 (6th Cir. 1977); Suarez v. United States, 309
F.2d 709, 712 (5th Cir. 1962).
57.
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However, in criminal cases some courts recognized that
when the accused or a witness on his behalf cannot understand or speak English the accused has the right .to an interpreter and this right is of constitutional proportions." The
rationale given is that the right to confront adverse witnesses,
as guaranteed by the sixth amendment, would be meaningless
if the accused could not understand their testimony. In United States v. Carrion5 the court emphasized that because the
determination of whether to appoint an interpreter rested
upon various factors, considerations of judicial economy dictated that the trial court be granted wide discretion in this
matter. Despite this, the court made it clear that the trial
court within its discretion should make unmistakeably clear
to a defendant who may not understand the language that he
he has the right to a court appointed interpreter, if upon inquiry the court ascertains that one is needed. Therefore, it is
advisable that an interpreter be appointed any time it appears
a party or a witness has difficulty apprehending what is being
said during the court proceeding.
One commentator suggests that persons related to or
aligned with the defendant, plaintiff, prosecution, or victim,
or those who have an interest in the action should not be appointed as an interpreter even though they would not necessarily fail as experts. However, in some instances it may be
necessary to appoint such persons where they are the only
ones who can understand the testimony of the particular party
involved.6 This proposition is supported by both federal and
7
Wyoming case law.
Conclusion
Under Rule 604 the only requirements are that the interpreter qualify as an expert and that he take an oath to interpret truthfully. It appears the appointment of an interpreter
is within the discretion of the trial judge, however, there is
some authority that whenever an accused or interested party
to the action is unable to understand the proceeding because
of language difficulties an interpreter should be appointed as
United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 907;
see also Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970).
65. Id.
66. LOUISELL & MUELLER § 272.
67. Fairbanks v. Cowan, supra note 63; Casciato v. Rennick, supra note 62.
64.
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a matter of right. Finally, there is nothing in Rule 604 which
would suggest any change in pre-existing Wyoming law.
RULE 605:

68
COMPETENCY OF JUDGE AS WITNESS

Introduction
Rule 605 unequivocally disqualifies a judge from testifying in a trial over which he presides and provides for an "automatic objection" if the judge does testify. Thus, there is no
need for a party to raise the issue at trial to preserve his rights
on appeal. The reason for allowing an automatic objection is
that to require an actual objection confronts the opponent
with a choice of not objecting and allowing the testimony, or
objecting and causing the judge to feel his integrity has been
attacked.69
Allowing a judge to testify necessarily places him in a
conflicted role. It is obvious that "[w] hen a judge is called as
a witness in a trial before him, his role as witness is manifestly
inconsistent with his customary role of impartiality in the
adversary system of trial." 70 Moreover, a judge would be
placed in the awkward position of weighing his own testimony, and passing on the competency thereof. Furthermore,
allowing testimony by a judge may inject an unwarranted risk
of unfair prejudice and place the party opposing the testimony
71
in the untenable position of cross examining the judge.
Rule 605 also reaches any equivalent of testimony by the
judge. Hence, under Wyoming Rule of Evidence 614 although
a judge is allowed to question a witness, he should not be allowed to ask questions which impart to the jury information
not previously put into evidence. He should not use questions
which reveal information gathered by him in the course of
ruling on objections, offers of proof, motions to suppress,
and motions in limine.72 A judge should also not be allowed
to take improper notice of adjudicative facts. Wyoming Rule
of Evidence 201 allows a judge to take notice of facts generRULE 605. COMPETENCY OF JUDGE AS WITNESS
The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. No
objection need be made in order to preserve the point.
69. FED. RULE EviD. 605, Adv. Comm. Note.
70. McCORMICK § 68, at 147.

68.

71.

LOUISELL & MUELLER § 280.

72. Id.
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ally known within the jurisdiction or facts capable of verification. Facts that are known personally to the judge do not
come within the scope of judicially noticeable facts and,
therefore, notice of these facts should be considered violative
73
of Rule 605.
Rule 605 does not speak to situations where a judge presides at a suppression hearing or a motion in limine and later
presides at trial, where a judge presides at trial and thereafter
decides a post-trial motion, or where a judge presides at trial
and later presides over a sentencing hearing. In these cases a
judge should employ information he has obtained during the
74
proceedings in making the ruling.
Effect on Wyoming Law
Under the traditional view a judge was regarded as competent to testify in trials over which he presided. Later, several jurisditions found judges were disqualified from testifying to material facts, but held they could testify to merely
formal and undisputed matters. The modem approach, which
is in accord with Rule 605, is that a judge is incompetent to
testify in a case which he is trying. 5 There is no case law or
statutes in Wyoming concerning this issue, therefore, it is
impossible to ascertain what rule Wyoming adhered to in the
past.
Under federal law a judge must disqualify himself when
he has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts,
when he is or has been a material witness, or when his impartiality may reasonably be questioned. 6 A judge's obligation to excuse himself for reasons of personal knowledge arise
only when knowledge has been acquired from extrajudicial
sources. Accordingly, knowledge officially gathered by a judge
during pretrial stages does not require a judge to disqualify
77
himself.
Wyoming has no statute similar to federal statute 28
U.S.C. § 455. Consequently, there is no requirement that a
judge disqualify himself when he possesses personal knowl73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.; see also Terrell v. United States 6 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1925).
Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1198 (1968).
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1948).
LOUISELL & MUELLER § 278.
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edge. However, the Wyoming Supreme Court has held that a
member of a judcial or quasi-judicial body who is interested
either directty or indirectly in the outcome of a proceeding
is under an obligation to disqualify himself. 78 One may be
able to argue by analogy, that personal knowledge of the
matter necessarily vests the judge with an interest in the outcome and her should therefore excuse himself.
The mere calling of a judge as a witness, even though he
refuses to testify, may result in prejudice. This would require
the reviewing court to decide whether requesting the judge's
testimony- was sufficiently prejudicial to require a reversal.
Factors which would need to be considered are: what was
said in the-jury's presence; the importance of the testimony
and the other witnesses' knowledge of the event. Moreover, if
a judge has critical information and refuses to testify, reversal
for exclusion of vital evidence may be warranted. 79 The
above-analysis demands the conclusion that Wyoming judges
follow a practice consistent with the federal statute in order
to avoid the problems which will necessarily arise if they attempt to try cases in which there is a substantial likelihood
they will be called as a witness.
There is no indication that Rule 605 raises any barriers to
an action by a judge based on in court observation.8 0 This result is supported by Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure
41(a) which authorizes summary punishment via criminal
contempt if the judge certifies he saw or heard conduct constituting the-contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. In this situation, the judge will be
acting both as chief witness and trier of fact. Rule 41(b) does
disqualify a judge from presiding at proceedings to punish
contempt if the contempt charge involves disrespect or criticism of the judge himself. This rule is premised on grounds
of possible prejudice, rather than a disqualification for personal knowledge.
Finally, if a judge with personal knowledge decides to recuse himself after trial has commenced it is necessary to com78.
79.
80.

Lake De Smet Reservoir Co. v. Kaufman, 75 Wyo. 87, 292 P.2d 482 (1956).
605 [021.
WEINSTEIN
Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964) (this decision is based on Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 42(a) which is identical to Wyoming Rule 41(a)).
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ply with Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 6381 or Wyoming
Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.82 Briefly, Rule 63 provides
that in case of death, sickness or other disability (which has
been held to include personal knowledge)8 of the trial judge,
after a verdict is returned or findings of fact and conclusions
of law are filed, then his successor may perform the duties of
the original trial judge. There is no provision in the rule which
authorizes reassignment of the case when the trial judge becomes disabled before a verdict has been returned or findings
and conclusions filed. Thus, Judge Weinstein argues that Rule
63 does not apply if a judge is disqualified in the midst of
trial, and if he is at that point, a new trial must be granted.Y
Professor Mueller reaches a contrary result, reasoning that:
If it is constitutional to permit reassignment after verdict or findings and conclusions, when post trial motions may still be made, it is hard to see why it is untrial when
constitutional to reassign the cause during
85
the presiding judge must recuse himself.
Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 26 is substantially
the same as Rule 63, but in addition it allows for substitution
during trial, before a verdict or finding of guilt.8
Conclusion
Rule 605 absolutely disqualifies a judge from testifying in
a trial at which he presides. Furthermore, Wyoming should
follow federal statute 28 U.S.C. § 455 and require judges to
disqualify themselves if they possess personal knowledge of
evidentiary facts or there is a likelihood they will be called as
a witness in the proceeding. Finally, a judicial officer called
to the stand in a case over which he is not presiding is competent to testify.
Wyo. R. Crv. P. 63 DISABILITY OF A JUDGE.
Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 26 JUDGE DISABILITY.
Bennett v. United States, 285 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
911.
84. WEINSTEIN
605 [02] ; see also Arrow-Hart, Inc. v. Phillip Carey Co., 552 F.2d
711 (6th Cir. 1977) (New trial required where judge died before making findings of
fact; where one party refused to stipulate that new judge could decide the case on
the record).
85. LOUISELL & MUELLER § 278, at 55; for a detailed discussion of Federal Rule of
605 [021.
Civil Procedure 63 see LOUISELL & MUELLER § 278; WEINSTEIN
86. For an in depth analysis of the constitutional problems of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 25, which is in material aspects the same as Wyoming Rule 26, see WEINSTEIN
605 [03] ; LOUISELL & MUELLER § 278.
81.
82.
83.
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RULE 606: COMPETENCY OF JUROR AS WITNESS8 7
Wyoming Rule of Evidence 606(a) provides that a juror
may not testify as a witness at the trial in which he is sitting.
It is a broad rule of incompetency and one in which the discretion of the judge has no role.8 The rationale for not allowing jurors to testify is that cross-examination and impeachment
would be inhibited because of the fear of offending the jurorwitness. Further, such a juror may lose his impartiality either
by identifying with the party calling him8 9 or by giving excessive weight to his own testimony. There is also the concern that a juror who has expressed his opinions on the witness stand may cling to them unyieldingly on his return to
the jury box. 9
Not all commentators however, prescribe to the drafters'
reasoning. Wigmore, for example, supported testimony by
jurors on the basis that proper voir dire of the jury would
eliminate many of the problems by excluding persons from
the jury who have personal knowledge or material facts. It
was also his contention that the impartiality of the remaining
jurors would neutralize any bias created in a juror due to his
testifying. 91 Moreover some state jurisdictions, by virtue of
either case law or statute permitted a juror to be called to the
witness stand. 92 It should further be noted that both federal9
and Wyoming case law is void on this subject.
RULE 606. COMPETENCY OF JUROR AS WITNESS
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before
that jury in the trial of the case in which he is sitting as a juror. If he is called so to
testify, the opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to object out of the
presence of the jury.
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the
validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or
statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of
anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes
in connection therewith, nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him
concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received, but a juror may testify on the questions whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.
88. The rule, however, does permit the judge to interrogate the jurors as to what effect
publicity concerning the case has had on them and about attempted tampering.
WEINSTEIN
606 [02],at 16.
89. Id. at 17.
90. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1910, at 770 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE .
91. Id at 771.
92. Id at 771; MCCORMICK § 68, at 148; JONES § 20:57, at 725. It should be noted,
however, that a juror's testimony was not allowed if the purpose was impeachment
of the verdict. MCCORMICK § 68, at 148.
93. WEINSTEIN
606 [02], at 20.
87.
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Rule 606(a) also provides that it is necessary to object if
a juror is called to testify, since the rule does not operate
automatically to exclude such testimony. When and if an objection is made, it should be done out of the presence of the
jury to avoid any possible prejudice to the objecting party.9 4
A related matter which is likewise banned by Rule 606(a)
is the communication of personal knowledge about material
facts by one juror to the others in the jury room. The incidence may arise when the voir dire examination of the jury
has been less than adequate. In essence, the juror who discloses his personal knowledge concerning a defendant to the
other jurors is being a witness against him under circumstances
which preclude the defendant from confronting the juror as a
witness. 95 Wigmore views such disclosure as hearsay and
notes that such "testimony" against the defendant is particularly bad because it is not subject to cross-examination. 6 In
Owen v. McMann, 97 two jurors communicated to the other
jurors their personal knowledge of defendant's misdeeds which
were unrelated to the charge. The court stated that not all
discussion of extra-record matters makes the jurors "unsworn
witnesses" but that the court must look at the nature of the
matter and the probability that prejudice will result. 98 It was
held that in that instance there was such a probability of prejudice that the verdict was lacking in due process. 99 This is
not to say that jurors may not inject their own philosophies
and wisdom into their deliberations. 10 0 In this regard, Wyoming law recognizes the propriety of allowing jurors to consider the knowledge and experience which they possess in
common with mankind. 1 1
In the event a judge discovers that a juror has personal
knowledge which he has not yet relayed to the others, the
judge is left with several options depending upon the circumstances of the case. In a civil case where the information is
not necessary, the judge could discharge the juror and use an
94.
95.
96.
97.

WRE 606(a).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI, amend. XIV.
WIGMORE § 1800, at 333.
435 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1970).

98. Id. at 818.

99.
100.
101.

Id.
United States v. McKinney, 429 F.2d 1019, 1022-23 (5th Cir. 1970).
Brown v. State, 80 Wyo. 12, 336 P.2d 794, 798 (1959); Shikany v. Salt Creek
Trans. Co., 48 Wyo. 190,45 P.2d 645,655 (1935).
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alternate juror or seek a stipulation permitting a jury of less
than twelve.102 Rule 606(a) forecloses the alternative of simply putting the juror on the stand and allowing him to testify. If the juror's testimony is important, the judge must declare a mistrial in either a civil or a criminal case since it would
become impossible to reconcile the requirements for full disclosure of all relevant evidence and the requirement of a dis03
interested trier of fact.
Although the possibility of improper communication in
the jury room will never be eliminated, the chances of its occurrence can be substantially reduced by a thorough voir dire
examination of the jury panel which would result in the exclusion from the jury those persons possessing such personal
knowledge. Rather than asking merely whether the juror
knows the defendant, it would be well to inquire whether he
04
knows anything about the defendant.
Rule 606(b)
Wyoming Rule 606(b), which is identical to its federal
counterpart, offers an accommodation between policies designed to safeguard the institution of trial by jury and policies
designed to insure a just result in an individual case.'05 The
rule accomplishes its purpose by disallowing juror testimony
as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of
the jury's deliberations; however, there are two exceptions to
the rule. First, the rule does not foreclose testimony by jurors
concerning prejudicial extraneous information. Secondly, the
rule does not preclude juror testimony as to outside influences
injected or brought to bear upon the deliberative process.
Consequently, Rule 606(b) is a rule of incompetency barring
jurors from testifying to the motives, methods, or mental
processes by which they reached their verdict. 106 The rule
was given support as early as 1892 when the United States
Supreme Court found that "a juryman may testify to any
facts bearing upon the question of the existence of any extraneous influence, although not as to how far that influence
07
operated upon his mind."
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

WYO. R. CIV. P. 48; WEINSTEIN 606 [021, at 21.
WEINSTEIN 606 [021, at 22.
Owen v. McMann, supra note 97.
FED. RULE EVID. 606(b), Adv. Comm. Note, subdivision (b).
WEINSTEIN 606 [04], at 606-27.
Mattox v. United States 146 U.S. 140, 148-49 (1892).
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One reason often given to justify the rule is that it is necessary to prevent jurors from being harassed by the defeated
party in an effort to secure evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. Also, the
rule is viewed as being necessary to prevent what was intended to be a private deliberation from becoming subject to constant public scrutiny "to the destruction of all frankness and
freedom of discussion and conference."' 0 8 In addition, allowing unrestricted attacks by jurors on their verdicts would so
undermine the finality of verdicts as to threaten the system
itself. 10 9 On the other hand, allowing proof of extraneous and
outside information satisfies those critics who argue that a
rule putting verdicts beyond the effective reach of the parties
only promotes irregularity and injustice.110
Operation of the Rule
Rule 606(b) would exclude, for example, testimony that
a juror misunderstood or disregarded evidence or the judge's
instructions. Also precluded is testimony to the effect a juror
thought the jury would be kept out indefinitely. Testimony
that a juror had held the failure to take the stand against the
accused or that the juror stated a desire to return home could
not be admitted under Rule 606(b)."'
As previously mentioned, the rule would allow impeachment of a jury's verdict by any sort of information which
might have affected the jury's verdict if it was conveyed to
the jury through extraneous sources, unless the information
was commonly known."' Consequently, if a juror acquired
specific personal knowledge about a party or the controversy
prior to trial and such knowledge might affect the verdict,
testimony to that effect is permissible."' On the other hand
testimony would be allowed where one or more jurors conducted during deliberations extra-record investigations of the
parties or the controversy," 4 the jury used or took to its de108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

McDonald and Unites States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Pless 238 U.S. 264, 268
(1915).
LOUISELL & MUELLER § 286.
FED. RULE EVID. 606(b), Adv. Comm. Note, subdivision (b).
WEINSTEIN
606 (04], at 606-30; For an extensive list of matters and statements
excludable under Rule 606(b), see LOUISELL & MUELLER § 287.
LOUISELL & MUELLER § 288.

113. United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 1975).
114. Gafford v. Warden, 434 F.2d 318, 320 (10th Cir. 1970).
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liberations unauthorized objects,"' or information, which
may have affected the verdict, made its way into the jury
room through the media. 1 6 Generally, the party seeking to
set aside a verdict cannot succeed unless it appears that such
information had a prejudicial impact upon the jury."' Also,
the rule would prohibit inquiry into the effect the abovementioned irregularities had on the minds of the jurors.
The second exception in Rule 606(b) permits impeachment of verdicts by evidence of outside influence improperly
brought to bear upon any juror. The purpose of the exception
is to permit proof of external pressures which might affect
the verdict and is most often invoked in cases involving improper extrajudicial contacts between third persons and one
or more jurors."8 For example, exposure of a juror or his
family to threats," 9 acceptance of bribes, 12 or communication between a juror and witnesses 121 are all instances of outside influence, concerning which testimony is proper. The exception does not reach the case of coercion of a juror by a
fellow juror because it does not qualify as an outside influence.
Various types of conduct may present difficulties under
Rule 606(b). Problems arise in situations where a juror makes
statements that are biased or prejudicial, derogatory of one
party or his witness, contain racial overtones. The essential
question in these situations is whether proof of these statements can be separated from the effect the statements had on
the jury. The line is a difficult one to draw and Judge Weinstein argues it is better to decide in favor of jury privacy.l'
Judge Weinstein reasons further that many statements are
made during the jury's deliberations which have little or no
effect on the outcome. Hence, the trial judge should have discretion to determine the significance of the remarks and if he
finds the statements inseperable from their effect should declare them improvable. 1
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Paz v. United States, 462 F.2d 740, 746 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
820.
United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061, 1064 (7th Cir. 1972).
LOUISELL & MUELLER § 288.
Id. at § 289.
Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1968).
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1953).
Romo v. State, 500 P.2d 678 (Wyo. 1972).
WEINSTEtN
606 [04] ,at 606-36.
Id.
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The restrictions imposed by Rule 606(b) do not apply to
testimony or affidavits by jurors relating to matters occurring
before or after deliberations, nor do they apply to false answers given during voir dire. 12' Furthermore, the restrictions
do not operate to disqualify a judge from questioning a jury
that returns with an ambiguous or inconsistent verdict, and the
rule does not bar testimony by a juror, that all jurors agree
that through inadvertance, oversight, or mistake the verdict
announced was not the verdict on which agreement had been
made. 121 Finally, the rule does not prohibit the polling of the
jury. If the requisite number of votes are not present to support the verdict, the jury should be sent back to continue de126 This latter rule
liberations or a new trial should be granted.
127
has been followed in Wyoming by statute.
Rule 606(b) is silent as to whether evidence should be
permitted that jurors reached a verdict by an improper method such as majority vote, quotient, or lots. Arguably, it is
better to treat such proof as incompetent because it amounts
to an indication of the jury's mental processes. Furthermore,
it is hard to imagine that the jury did not deliberate prior to
deciding to reach a verdict in such a manner. It simply represents a mode of compromising after disagreement and should
not be singled out from the other instances where jurors ad12 8
just initial positions to reach unanimity.
Procedurefor ImpeachingJury Verdicts
The party seeking a new trial because of jury misconduct
must generally make a preliminary showing, on the basis of
affidavits, that misconduct sufficient to impeach the verdict
may have occurred. 129 If jury misconduct sufficient to warrant a new trial comes to the attention of a party during trial,
he must call it to the court's attention. If he does not, he
risks waiving any right to relief. That is, he cannot sit silently
by and hope for a favorable verdict. 1' ° A motion for a new
trial because of jury misconduct must be made within ordi124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

LOUISELL & MUELLER § 290.
606 [04], at 606-34.
WEINSTEIN
Bruce v. Chestnut Farms-Chevy Chase Dairy, 126 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
WYO. STAT. § 1-11-213 (1977); WYO. STAT. § 7-11-501 (1977).
606 [04 1,at 606-42.
WEINSTEIN
United States v. Eagle 539 F.2d 1166, 1169 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1110 (1977).
LOUISELL & MUELLER § 291.
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nary time limits. However, if facts of misconduct are discovered after the time for the motion has expired, limits do not
apply and a party may make his motion by collateral attack
upon the judgment. 131
A party who makes a proper preliminary showing is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the alleged jury misconduct, and in criminal cases the entitlement is of constitutional dimension. 22 Also, in criminal cases contact between jurors
and witnesses or jurors and prosecutors is presumptively prejudicial and the government is obliged to show the absence of
prejudice.133
Effect on Wyoming Law
Prior to the enactment of Rule 606(b) Wyoming allowed
a verdict by lot or chance to be inquired into by means of a
juror's affidavit.'3 Otherwise, prior Wyoming law is consistent
with the new rule. For example, the Wyoming Supreme Court
has found that submission to the jury of papers or exhibits
not received into evidence at trial is a proper subject for inquiry, and constitutes prejudicial error absent a showing to
In addition, the court has held a losing party
the contiary.'
cannot, in order to secure a new trial, use testimony of jurors
to impeach their verdict thus, affidavits of jurors in regard to
what was said or considered during their deliberations must
be disallowed.13 Finally, the court has found improper communications between a juror and a witness in a criminal trial
is presumably prejudicial to the defendant. 3 7 Once such a
communication has been shown to have taken place, the burden is upon the prosecutor to demonstrate its harmless effect. 13 Consequently, Rule 606(b) will have very little effect
on existing Wyoming practice.
131. Id.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Gafford v. Warden, supra note 114.
Rernmer v. United States, supra note 120; Rono v. State, supra note 121.
Elite Cleaners & Tailors, Inc. v. Gentry, 510 P.2d 784, 787 (Wyo. 1973).
Hays v. State, 522 P.2d 1004 (Wyo. 1974).
York v. North Cent. Gas Co., 69 Wyo. 98, 237 P.2d 845, 852 (1951); Morris v.

138.

Romo v. State, supro note 121.

State, 39 Wyo. 24, 270 P. 415 (1928); Bunce v. McMahon, 6 Wyo. 24, 42 P.23
(1895).
137. Romo v. State, supra note 121; Nicholson v. State, 18 Wyo. 298, 106 P. 929
(1910).
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RULE 607: WHo MAY IMPEACH'n
Introductionand Application
Rule 607 abrogates the traditional rule against impeaching one's own witness and specifically provides that a witness
may be attacked by any party, including the party calling
him. Several reasons have been advanced in support of the
conventional rule, the most prevalent being that a party by
calling a witness vouches for his trustworthiness. The theory
rests on the false assumption that a party exercises a free
choice in selecting his witnesses. Though the "voucher" rule
may have been logical under the common law because witnesses were chosen by a party to affirm his veracity, under
the modern adversary system parties are rarely able to select
their witnesses, but must take them where and how they find
them.140 Consequently, the United States Supreme Court in
Chambers v. Mississippil4 ' concluded that the voucher rule
could not be used to preclude a defendant from cross-examining his own witness for purposes of impeachment where the
witness's statement was seriously adverse to the defendant,
and inconsistent with prior statements he had made under
oath. 4 3 Therefore, in criminal cases Rule 607 is merely an
extension of existing law with respect to impeaching one's
own witness by the use of prior inconsistent statements.
A second reasoih advanced in support of the traditional
rule was that if impeachment was allowed, the witness could
be coerced into testifying favorably under an implied threat
that his character would be disparaged if he did not. However,
forbidding attack by the calling party still leaves the witness
at the mercy of the witness and his adversary. For example, if
truth is on the side of the calling party but the witness's character is bad, the witness may be attacked by the adversary if
139. RULE 607. WHO MAY IMPEACH
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party
calling him.
607 [01].
140. WEINSTEIN
141. 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973).
142. In Chambers v. United States, witness McDonald made a sworn confession prior to
trial and then at the time of trial repudiated his confession. The defendant was
forced to call McDonald to the stand because the prosecutor chose not to do so.
Under Mississippi law a party could not impeach his own witness and under hearsay
rules the defendant was unable to present witnesses in his behalf who would discredit McDonald's repudiation and demonstrate his complicity in the crime. The
Court held that the "voucher" rule as applied plainly interferred with Chambers'
constitutional right to defend against the state's charges.
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he speaks the truth. But, if he lies opposing counsel will not
attack and the calling party is precluded from attacking."'
Finally, proponents of the old rule express the fear the
jury may accept impeaching evidence as substantive proof.
Although the jury may in fact accept the evidence as substantive, one must consider this danger exists no matter who
brings the evidence into court.
Under Rule 607 the calling party may impeach his own
witness by any of the five modes of impeachment recognized
at common law. The five methods include: (1) proof of bias,
(2) mental incapacity, (3) contradiction, (4) prior inconsistent
statements, and (5) bad character involving conviction of a
crime.14
Bias rests on the assumptions that certain relationships
and circumstances impair impartiality of the witness, and the
witness who is not impartial may sometimes intentionally or
unintentionally shade his testimony in favor of or against one
of the parties. Several limitations are placed on the use of evidence to show bias. Furthermore, the judge has discretion to
control the extent of proof by excluding evidence relevant to
bias because of the operation of constitutional exclusionary
rules such as the privilege against self-incrimination. Also, the
judge may exclude evidence if the probative value of the evidence does not outweigh factors of prejudice, confusion, and
waste of time under Rule 403.145
To impeach through the use of mental incapacity one
must show the witness's capacity to observe, narrate, and remember is impaired. The) reason for allowing this mode of
impeachment, is to impress upon the jury the possibility that
a witness who is incapable of accurate observation, recollection, or communication, may be incapable of testifying truth146
fully despite his best intentions.
Impeachment by contradiction is accomplished by showing specific errors in the witness's testimony. It rests on the
inference that if a witness lied or was mistaken on one fact
143.
144.

MCCORMICK § 38.

146.

Id. at

WEINSTEIN 1 607 1021.
145. Id. at 1 607 [03].
607 [04].
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perhaps he lied or made mistakes on other facts and, there147
fore, all his testimony may be untrustworthy.
Before the enactment of the rules, prior inconsistent statements could be used to impeach one's own witness where the
testimony surprised the party and was harmful to his case.'48
The prior inconsistent statement could only be used for purposes of impeachment and not as substantive evidence because
they were considered to be hearsay. However, with the enactment of the rules a prior statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at a trial or hearing, the statement is subject
to cross-examination, the statement is inconsistent with the
witness's testimony, and the statement was given under oath
subject to the penalty of perjury. 149 Furthermore, under Rule
607 there appears to be no requirement of surprise or actual
harm before a prior inconsistent statement can be introduced
to impeach.'50
Despite the favorable aspects of Rule 607, disposing of
the requirements of harm and surprise as prerequisites to the
use of prior inconsistent statements may result in misuse of
the rule as a vehicle to get hearsay before the jury. Because
Wyoming Rule 801(d)(1)(A) does not cover prior statements
not made under oath, they are still considered hearsay, and
while they may be used to impeach a witness, they may not
be considered for the truth of the matter asserted. Consequently, a party who expects unfavorable testimony should
not be allowed to put a witness on the stand and then, under
the guise of impeachment, get before the jury an ex parte
statement of the witness in hopes that the jury will consider
the contents substantively.' 5 ' Similarly, if the witness does
not injure a party's case, but merely fails to give assistance,
there is no damage to refrain. Without such damage, a proId. at : 607 [05].
United States v. Allsup, 485 F.2d 287 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Coppola,
479 F.2d 1153 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Watson, 450 F.2d 290 (8th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 993 (1972); United States v. Hicks, 420 F.2d 814
(5th Cir. 1970) (party may impeach his own witness in the event he was surprised
and he can show affirmative damage); Mares v. State, 500 P.2d 530 (Wyo. 1972);
Horn v. State, 12 Wyo. 80, 73 P. 705 (1903).
149. WRE 801(d)(1)(A).
150. United States v. Palacios, 556 F.2d 1359, 1363 (5th Cir. 1977) (The court, citing
Rule 607, held the government can impeach own witness by its prior inconsistent
statement without showing surprise).
151. Bershaw v. United States, 353 F.2d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 1965); see also Bartley v.
United States, 319 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Foitaine v. Patterson, 305 F.2d 124
(5th Cir. 1962); (a witness may not be called in order that he might be impeached).

147.
148.
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ponent could offer a prior inconsistent statement only for
one reason: to expose to the jury its contents in anticipation
that they would accept the statement as substantive evidence. 152 Thus, the argument can be made that the elements
of surprise and harm must still be present under Rule 607 before prior inconsistent statements, which do not qualify as not
hearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(A), can be used to impeach
one's own witness. On the other hand, the psychological tendancy of a jury to connect a witness with the party calling
him should deter wholesale subversion of Rule 607's intended purpose. For example, it is difficult to imagine a situation
where a party would seriously attempt a complete impeachment of a chosen witness because of the inherent danger that
the impression on the jury would be totally adverse.
Finally, impeachment through the use of character and
conduct is allowed and is discussed in detail under Rule 608.
And impeachment by showing conviction of a crime is discussed under Rule 609.
Effect on Wyoming Law
Under existing law, Wyoming, by statute and case authority allows impeachment by prior inconsistent statements if
certain criteria are met. Section 1-12-106 of the 1977 Wyoming Session LawsM deals with impeachment of witnesses in
civil and criminal cases. In pertinent part it provides a party
may not impeach his own witness by evidence of bad character, but may contradict him by other evidence including prior
inconsistent statements, provided the circumstances of the
statement sufficient to designate the particular occasion are
mentioned to the witness, the witness is asked whether he
made such statements, and if so the witness is allowed to explain them. Similarly, the Wyoming Supreme Court has found
that the prosecution has the right to prove a witness produced
by it has made at other times statements inconsistent with his
present testimony. But before the witness may be impeached
he must be told the circumstances of the prior statement, and
5 4
he must be asked whether or not he made the statement.
152.
153.
154.

Peeples, PriorInconsistent Statements and the Rule Against Impeachment of One's
Own Witness: The Proposed FederalRules, 52 TEX. L. REV. 1383 (1974).
WYO. SESS. LAWS § 1-12-106 (1977). This provision recodified WYO. STAT. § 1-143
(1957). The statutes are the same with regard to their content, with only slight
changes in the 1977 version).
Mares v. State, 500 P.2d 530 (Wyo. 1972); Horn v. State, 12 Wyo. 80, 73 P. 705
(1903).
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Rule 607 expressly supersedes Section 1-12-106 and consequently raises some doubt whether any foundation as to
the circumstances of the statement need be presented before
it can be used for purposes of impeachment. Federal cases applying Rule 607155 have not reached the point and because
there is no mention of this requirement in the rule it appears
that a foundation is no longer necessary as a prerequisite to
the use of prior inconsistent statements.
Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a)(1) provides that
any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of
contradicting or impeaching the testimony of a deponent as
a witness. This rule is consistent with Rule 607 and is not affected by it.
Conclusion
Rule 607 changes existing Wyoming law to the extent
that it allows for impeachment by any party, by any means
recognizable under the common law. Consequently, Wyoming's prior adherence to the traditional doctrine that a party
could not impeach his own witness through the use of bad
character is invalid. Furthermore, it appears that pursuant to
Rule 607 there is no longer any requirement of surprise or
harm before prior inconsistent statements can be used.
RULE 608: EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT

156

Wyoming Rule of Evidence 608 is an impeachment rule involving evidence of character and conduct of a witness. It is
one of the exceptions to the general rule stated in Wyoming
155.
156.

United States v. Alvarez, 548 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1977; United States v. Morgan,
555 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1977).
RULE 608. EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF WITNESS
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputa-

tion, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by
opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.
They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does
not operate as a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination when examined
with respect to matters which relate only to credibility.
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Rule of Evidence 404(a) forbidding the use of character evidence to prove a person acted in conformity therewith on a particular ocassion. 151 Specifically, the rule allows one to prove
that a witness did not testify truthfully by showing evidence
of his untruthful character. Likewise, a witness' character for
truthfulness may be used to prove his testimony is believeable, but only after his credibility has been attacked. The rule
is grounded on the premise that an honest person will testify
truthfully'5 -and that a liar's testimony is suspect. 59 Character is a propensity for a certain kind of conduct or a pattern of conduct and the character of a witness for truthfulness is relevant circumstantial evidence on the question of the
truth of his testimony."' Such character evidence has long
been sanctioned by the common law,' 1' and is recognized in
Wyoming as a customary method of impeachment. 16 Evidence of bad or immoral character in general is not admissible,
as Rule 608 authorizes only evidence which bears on veracity. 63 The character of a witness for truthfulness may be
shown by testimony as to reputation, by testimony in the
form of opinion or by inquiry into specific instances of conduct.164 The rule applies in civil and criminal cases and permits the introduction of the pertinent character evidence on
the direct-examination or cross-examination 6 5 of either the
witness whose credibility is in question (hereinafter sometimes
called the principal witness) or a character witness i.e., one
familiar with the character of the principal witness.
The dangers associated with character evidence are that it
may result in prejudice, confusion of the issues, protraction
of the trial and the possibility that the jury will not limit
such evidence to the issue of credibility. Due to these dangers,
the trial judge is vested with considerable discretion to exclude relevant character evidence if the dangers outweigh the
66
probative value of the evidence.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

WRE 404(a).
MCCORMICK § 191, at 454.
WEINSTEIN
608 [01], at 608-8.
MOORE § 608.10, at 84.
WIGMORE § 986, at 855-862.
Huber v. Thomas, 45 Wyo. 440, 19 P.2d 1042, 1044 (1933).
WEINSTEIN
608 [03], at 608-18.

164. WRE 405.
165.
166.

WEINSTEIN
WRE 403.

608 [01],at 608-10.
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Reputation
Presenting evidence of reputation is the traditional way
to prove the principal witness' character for untruthfulness.
Wyoming Rule of Evidence 608, in accord with the prevailing
view,' 67 limits the inquiry to reputation for truth and veracity.
A character witness is qualified to state the reputation of the
principal witness if he knows "the general speech of people
concerning the [principal] witness and the common repute
which the latter enjoys among those who know him." 1 6 Since
the principal witness's credibility is relevant only at the time
he testified, proper inquiry on impeachment should elicit only
his present reputation for truthfulness. 9 The source of the
reputation evidence is no longer restricted to the community
where the principal witness lives, but rather may come from
any place where he is well known,1 7 such as his place of
7 2
work, 7 1 so long as the reputation is general and established. 1
It should be noted that when qualifying a reputation witness
it is improper to ask whether he knows of specific instances
of conduct upon which the reputation is based, as such specific instances are properly elicited only on cross-examina173
tion.
Opinion
Opinion has been described as a generalization from observation of a person's actions. 174 In permitting the use of
opinion evidence to prove character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, Rule 608 deviates markedly from the commonlaw exclusion of such evidence. Evidence of opinion based on
observation was excluded because the courts believed it would
provoke distracting side-issues concerning the grounds for the
opinion. 175 This exclusion has been criticized as "misguided,"176 "historically unsound" and "unfortunate".'7 Witnesses
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

MCCORMICK § 44, at 90; JONES, 4 THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 26:18, at 212 (6th
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as JONES].
JONES § 26:18, at 213.
The practice, however, has been to allow substantial remoteness on the theory that
character is slow to change. JONES § 26:17, at 210.
Craven v. State, 22 Ala. App. 39, 111 So. 767, 769 (1927).
State v. Axilrod, 248 Minn. 204, 79 N.W.2d 677, 682 (1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 938 (1957).
MCCORMICK § 44, at 92.
WRE 405(a).
MCCORMICK § 191, at 457 n.74.
MCCORMICK § 44, at 91.
Id. at 90.
7 WIGMORE, §§ 1981-1986.
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who claimed to be giving the reputation of the principal witness' character may have actually been giving their opinion of
that character. An exception developed which allowed questioning of an impeachment witness as to whether he would
78
believe the principal witness when testifying under oath,
which in essence called for an opinion.'7 The new rule expressly authorizes opinion evidence subject to the same restrictions which apply to reputation evidence, i.e., the evidence must refer only to character for veracity and evidence
of truthful character is admissible only after it has been attacked.1i 0 The opinion witness need not have known the
principal witness a long time nor have recent information
about him.' 8 ' One commentator believes the new rule will
particularly affect the use of psychiatrists who, after observing the principal witness testifying, are called to give their
opinion as to his credibility. 8 2 The consequence he forsees
is an increase in this practice since the new rule makes it unnecessary to comply with the technical opinion evidence rule.
The old rule formerly required an expert to couch his opinion
in terms of art relating to mental capacity.8 3 Regardless of
the change in rules, the lack of scientific certainty concerning
the criteria involved in such opinions, is likely to remain a restraint on any such expansion. 8
Specific Instances of Conduct
Specific instances of conduct are generally not admissible
to attack or support the credibility of a witness. However, if
the trial judge believes they are probative of veracity, a witness may be cross-examined as to specific instances of conduct
which reflect on his character for truthfulness or on the character of the principal witness. But, in order to be admitted,
the witness's testimony on direct-examination must have
touched upon the particular witness's character for truthfulness. The primary purpose for allowing this type of crossexamination is to test the credibility of a character witness
by determining whether he is truly familiar with the back178.
179.
180.
181.
182,

Held v. United States, 260 F. 932, 933 (5th Cir. 1919); United States v. Walker,
313 F.2d 236, 239 (6th Cir. 1963).
608, at 608-5.
WEINSTEIN
WRE 608(a).
608 [04], at 608-20.
WEINSTEIN
Id. at 608-21.

183. Id.
184. MOORE § 608.10, at 84.
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ground of the principal witness. For example, if the character
witness testifies on direct that the principal witness is a truthful person but cross-examination reveals that the character
witness is not aware of a perjury conviction, his testimony
may be viewed as untrustworthy by the jury.
Using a false name'5 and falsification of an employment
application 86 are other examples of specific instances of conduct which are admissible under the federal counterpart of
Rule 608.187 The Wyoming Supreme Court has held that acts
or occurrences which show the witness' general bad character
are not admissible to discredit him'8 8 unless they involve
moral turpitude, 189 nor is previous criminal activity which did
not result in a conviction. 9 0 Most jurisdictions limit such
cross-examination to acts which have some relation to the
credibility of the witness. 191 Federal courts view forgery, tax
fraud, bribery and false statement as acts of conduct bearing
on a person's character for truthfulness. 192 State courts add
such things as false pretenses, cheating, embezzlement and
bad checks to the list.193 Inadmissible for purposes of impeachment in Wyoming, are excessive drinking habits' 94 and conviction of the misdemeanor of carrying a concealed weapon
since such evidence is not probative of moral turpitude or a
lack of veracity. 195
Rule 608 further provides that these specific instances of
conduct may be put into evidence only through cross-examination. Extrinsic proof of these instances of conduct is not
allowed 196 due to considerations of time, surprise and prejudice. 97 In other words, the "examiner must take his answer."' 198 Other witnesses may not be called to refute an answer given by the witness but the rule does not prevent the
cross-examiner from continuing to press the witness for an
admission.199
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Lyda v. United States, 321 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1963).
Lewis v. Baker, 526 F.2d 470, 475 (2d Cir. 1975).
FED. R. EVID. 608.
Gabrielson v. State, 510 P.2d 534, 536 (Wyo. 1973).
State v. Pinkston, 33 Wyo. 428, 240 P. 219, 220 (1925) (operating a house of illfame); Espy v. State, 54 Wyo. 291, 92 P.2d 549, 556 (1939) (professional gambler).
Janski v. State, 538 P.2d 271, 274 (Wyo. 1975).
MCCORMICK § 42, at 82.
WEINSTEIN 1C608 [05] , at 608-28.
Id.
State v. Sorenson, 34 Wyo. 90, 241 P. 707, 708 (1925).
Eads v. State, 17 Wyo. 490, 101 P. 946, 951 (1909).
Evidence of a criminal conviction is an exception. WRE 609.
3 WIGMORE, § 979.
608 [051, at 608-22.
WEINSTEIN
Lewis v. Baker, 526 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1975).
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Discretion
The trial judge is granted broad discretion under Rule
608 to decide which specific instances of conduct may be
brought out on cross-examination. His function is to strike a
balance between the needs of the judicial system and the
needs of the witness."' He may exclude relevant specific instances of conduct if their probative value is outweighed by
the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or
waste of time.20 1 Further, the judge has at his disposal Wyoming Rule of Evidence 611(a) which enables him to exclude
evidence when necessary to protect a witness from undue embarrassment or harrassment.12 Although impeachment matters by their very nature will be embarrassing or prejudicial to
the witness, exclusion occurs only when the judge determines
that the embarrassment or prejudice has risen to an unacceptable level. 203 Moreover, certain evidence may be considered
temporally too remote to have any probative worth.
In State v. Koch,20 4 the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed
an exercise of discretion excluding evidence of bad character
for chastity which the defendant offered for impeachment of
credibility. Reversals occur when the judge exceeds the
bounds of his discretion, such as when he erroneously permits
the prosecution to examine a defendant as to his recent contacts with two known murderers, a highly prejudicial line of
questioning. 05
Self-Incrimination
The last sentence of Wyoming Rule of Evidence 608(b)
declares that the giving of testimony does not operate as a
waiver of the witness' privilege against self-incrimination when
questioned about matters of credibility. For example, a defendant who is charged with robbery and who takes the stand
to deny his guilt may invoke this privilege when asked whether he committed a previous murder for which he has not been
tried. The underlying reason is that, by testifying, he has exposed himself to cross-examination only as to the material
200.

United States v. Burch, 490 F. 2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1973).

201.
202.

WRE 403.
WRE 611(a).

203.
204.
205.

MOORE § 608.02,at 81.
64 Wyo. 175, 189 P.2d 162 (1948).
Johnson v. State, 8 Wyo. 494, 58 P. 761, 764 (1899).
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and consequential issues of the case which were covered on
direct examination, and not to questions concerning potentially incriminating past conduct which bears only on his
credibility.
Rule 608(b) is a sensible way to encourage disclosure to
the fact-finder without costing the witness his Fifth Amendment rights. 2 6 To view the act of testifying as a waiver of
these rights would leave little practical substance in the right
20 7
to testify in one's own behalf.
RULE 609: IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF
CONVICTION OF CRIME

20 8

Wyoming Rule of Evidence 609 tracks its federal counterpart 20 9 verbatim, approving the practice of impeachment by
evidence of convictions 210 for felonies2 1 ' and crimes involving
MOORE § 608.22, at 93.
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
RULE 609. IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION OF CRIME
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from
him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law
under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value
of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2)
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a
period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the
release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that
the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances
substantially outweighs the prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction
more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent
gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such
evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of
such evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificateof rehabilitation.Evidence of
a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject
of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications.Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not
admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile'adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction
of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the
court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of
the issue of guilt or innocence.
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is
admissible.
209. FED. R. EVID. 609.
210. The convictions need not have originated in the local jurisdiction, as they may have
occurred in other states or in the federal courts. MCCORMICK § 43, at 86; this policy is not a change in the Wyoming law. State v. Velsir, 61 Wyo. 476, 159 P.2d 371
(1945).
211. "Offenses which may be punished by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary
are felonies." WYO. STAT. § 6-1-102 (1977) "The minimum term of imprisonment
206.
207.
208.
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dishonesty and false statement. The underlying theory being
that such a convict may be less believable when giving testimony 212 and that a jury has a right to and a need for this relevant background information in assessing the witness' credibility. The rule is firmly rooted in the common law 21" and
recognized by Wyoming case law. 14 When the witness is the
accused, an improper inference that he is more likely to have
committed the offense may arise due to the conviction evidence.2 15 However, safeguards are incorporated into the rule
to minimize this danger. The evidence can only be elicited
during cross-examination and only for the purpose of impeachment. Although any type of felony conviction may be offered, it will be admitted only if the trial judge determines
that its' probative value outweighs the prejudice it may engender. Misdemeanor convictions are excluded unless they
involve dishonesty or false statement, sometimes referred to
216
as crimen falsi.
The Wyoming Supreme Court in Eads v. State,27 recognized that not all types of misconduct indicate an untruthful
witness, such as carrying a concealed weapon. The Court has
stated that the only proper impeachment evidence of this
sort would be crimes tending to show moral turpitude2 18 or
lack of veracity.219 This terminology is displaced by Wyoming
Rule of Evidence 609(a) which provides a more definite and
220
less arbitrary description of proper impeachment evidence.
Further, overly prejudicial evidence of felony conviction of
212.
213.

214.

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

in the penitentiary shall in no case be less than one year." WYo. STAT: § 6-1-106
(1977).
United States v. Harding, 525 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1975); Curran, FederalRule of Evidence 609(a), 49 TEMP. L. Q. 890 (1976).
Earlier in the common law, a witness was rendered incompetent to testify if he had
been convicted of a misdemeanor involving dishonesty or a felony such as treason,
fraud or deceit. This absolute ban was set aside in Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S.
467 (1917), and the rule evolved into an impeachment device. MCCORMICK § 43,
at 84; State v. Velsir, 61 Wyo. 476, 159 P.2d 371, 375 (1945).
Heberling v. State, 507 P.2d 1 (Wyo. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1022 (1973);
Kennedy v. State, 470 P.2d 372, reh. denied, 474 P.2d 127 (Wyo. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971); State v. Hines, 79 Wyo. 65, 331 P.2d 605 (1958) cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 972 (1961); State v. Velsir, 6 Wyo. 476, 159 P.2d 371 (1945);
Eads v. State, 17 Wyo. 490, 101 P. 946 (1909).
United States v. Harding, 525 F.2d 84, 89 (7th Cir. 1975).
Crimen falsi are crimes that by their nature tend to cast doubts on the veracity of
the ones who commit them. Commonwealth v. Gold, 155 Pa. Super. 364, 38 A.2d
486,489 (1944).
17 Wyo. 490, 101 P. 946 (1909).
Which crimes involve moral turpitude is not clear. In State v. Velsir, 6 Wyo. 476,
159 P.2d 371 (1945), the court held that even burglary is a crime involving moral
turpitude.
Eads v. State, 17 Wyo. 490,101 P. 946, 951 (1909).
WRE 609(a).
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any witness may be excluded in the discretion of the judge. 21
But it is only prejudice to the defendant which is considered,
as the rule does not protect other witnesses.22 2 The trial judge
is accorded flexibility in interpreting Rule 609 to effect the
congressional intention of protecting a testifying defendant
without awarding him a windfall or impeding the search for
truth.22 3 An example of this flexibility can be seen in Judge
Weinstein's opinion in United States v. Jackson.224 There, an
agreement was entered into between the court and the defendant whereby an assault conviction of the defendant was excluded in return for defendant's promise to not project to the
jury a spotless background and that he himself would not use
assault convictions to impeach the government witnesses. In
any event Rule 609 will not protect a defendant who has denied a conviction, distorted its nature or stated an unwillingness to engage in such crimes. 22
In exercising his discretion over the admissibility of felony
convictions, the judge may wish to consider the impeachment
value of the prior conviction, the witness's subsequent history,
the nearness or remoteness of the conviction, the similarity
between the two crimes and the importance of credibility
issue .26
Rule 609 places the burden of persuasion to establish the
probative value of the proffered conviction evidence on the

one who offers

2

it. 27

In order to meet this burden it will be

necessary in most instances to show the date, nature, place
and circumstances of the conviction. The extent he can delve
into the details once a conviction is admitted will be subject
to the discretion of the court. The defendant, however, is
permitted to rebut by providing evidence of the prejudicial
effect on the jury which would result if the conviction were
admitted.2 2 Naturally these arguments should take place out
of the hearing of the jury but it is important for appellate review that they be on record, as well as the court's explicit
findings as to its balancing process.22 9
221. MOORE § 609.14, at 145.
222. MOORE § 609.14 (41,at 148.
223.
224.

Curran,FederalRule of Evidence 609(a), 49 TEMP. L. Q. 890, 896 (1976).
405 F. Supp. 938 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).

225. United States v. Johnson, 542 F.2d 230, 234-35 (5th Cir. 1976).
226. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
227. United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922,929 (7th Cir. 1976).
228.
229.

Gordon v. United States, supra note 226, at 939.
United States v. Mahone, supra note 227, at 929.
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The discretion which the court holds to exclude evidence
in some areas does not extend to the admission into evidence
of conviction of crimes involving dishonesty or false statement 230 such as fraud2 31 or forgery.m The federal rulemakers
believed that these crimes will always be highly probative on
the issue of credibility.2 33 These convictions are admissible
whether felonies or misdemeanors and regardless of who is
testifying. This category of crime covers prejury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, false pretense and other
crimes in the nature of crimen falsi, the commission of which
involves an element of deceit, untruthfulness or falsification
which would bear on the convict's veracity.2 34 Robbery, attempted robbery2 and other crimes involving force do not
come under the definition, 236 nor does narcotics possession,
23
23 7
possession of a pistol without a license, or petit larceny.
Appellate Review
On review, an improper admission of evidence may be
viewed as harmless error2 9 and like most states Wyoming has
adhered to that proposition. In the case of Heberling v. State
the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the error in improperly excluding evidence may be harmless if the witness was
thoroughly discredited by the other evidence. 0
In United States v. Brown2 41 the district court of New
York discussed the strength of the prosecution's case as bearing on the seriousness of the error in improperly admitting
evidence, i.e., whether it is prejudicial or harmless. The position is that where the government has a strong case, the error
may not be prejudicial whereas if the case turns on the defendant's credibility as a witness, the error is likely to be prejudicial. Various standards have been voiced by the courts.
One such test is that a conviction should be reversed unless
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

United States v. Smith & Gartrell, 551 F.2d 348, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1326-27 (9th Cir. 1976).
United States v. Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir. 1976).
H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 7098, 7103.
Id.
United States v. Smith & Gartrell, supra note 230, at 362.

236. Id.
237. United States v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
238. Gov't of Virgin Is. v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 281 (3d Cir. 1976). Contra, United
States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443, 446 (5th Cir. 1976).
239. Carlsen v. Javurek, 526 F.2d 202, 210 (8th Cir. 1975).
240.

Heberling v. State, 507 P.2d 1 (Wyo. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1022 (1973).

241.

409 F. Supp. 890,892 (W.D.N.Y. 1976).
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it is highly probable that an error did not effect the judgment. 24 Also relevant is whether the appellate court can state
with assurance that the error did not influence the jury or
that it had only a slight effect on the deliberations.24 3
Stale Convictions
Under the new rule, conviction evidence is not admissible
more than ten years after the date of conviction or release
from confinement, whichever is later. Interests of fairness
and relevancy demanded a change24 4 from the common law
rule which did not set any concrete time periods for determining when a conviction would be deemed stale.4 5 An exception is made for convictions older than ten years if the court
finds that the probative value, as supported by specific facts
and circumstances, substantially outweighs the prejudicial
quality.2' 6 The rulemakers of the federal counterpart intended that this discretion would be used rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances. 4 7 The court must express its findings
on the record which justified its exceptional decision.2 48 To
prevent surprise, advance written notice to the adverse party
is required by the rule when convictions older than ten years
will be used. The notice requirement may present practical
problems because a party does not know which witness his
opponent will call and which ones he will have to impeach, as
2 49
witness lists are privileged work product.
Pardon
Wyoming Rule of Evidence 609(c) excludes conviction
evidence if a pardon, annulment or other procedure has been
granted upon a finding of rehabilitation, unless there has
been a subsequent felony conviction. The theory is that the
rule should not apply when the underlying justification for it
is no longer present. A pardon or annulment based on a finding of innocence also operates to exclude the conviction but
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Gov't of Virgin Is. v. Toto, supra note 238, at 284.
Kotteaks v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946); United States v. Harding,
supra note 215, at 91.
Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 166 (1940).
Most states do not have time limits. See MOORE § 609.01, at 130.
WRE 609(b).
Federal Rules of Evidence-Advisory Committee Notes-FED. R. EVID. 609, citing

Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, subdivision (b).
248. Id.
249. ROTHSTEIN, RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 246.5 (1975).
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in this instance a subsequent felony conviction will not revive
the admissibility of the earlier conviction, since such 2 a50 pardon has the effect of nullifying the conviction ab initio.
Juvenile Adjudications
Wyoming Rule of Evidence 609(e) continues the proscription against the use of juvenile adjudications for impeachment purposes. 251 This rule of exclusion is based on the belief
that juvenile proceedings lack the precision and general probative value of a criminal conviction due to their informal nature, the lesser standard of proof required and other variations from adult trial standards. In re Gault2 52 eliminates
some of these objectionable characteristics, as the United
States Supreme Court mandated that juveniles be extended
the same standards of due process as apply to adults. Nevertheless, it is still unclear what effect the decision will have on
25 3
the exclusionary rule.
In Davis v. Alaska, 54 the United States Supreme Court
held that an accused's right of confrontation is paramount to
the policy of protecting a juvenile offender in some situations.
There a conviction of grand larceny and burglary was reversed
because the defendant was not allowed to cross-examine a
witness concerning a juvenile proceeding in which he had
been adjudicated a delinquent for burglarizing two cabins.
Defendant argued such evidence showed a bias in the witness
based on his fear that due to his past record he himself may
be a suspect. In Connor v. State, 55 the Wyoming Supreme
Court was also confronted with the conflict between the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings and the right to effective
cross-examination. There the court recognized the validity of
the Davis exception but was unable to apply it since defense
counsel had failed to object and make known to the trial
court the evidence he sought.
The new rule allows a judge in a criminal case to admit
"evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than
250. MOORE § 609,01,at 131.
251. Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480, 482 (10th Cir. 1966); MCCORMICK § 43, at
86.
252. 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
253. JONES § 26.20, at 223.
254. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
255. Connor v. State, 537 P.2d 715 (Wyo. 1975).
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the accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible
to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied
that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence." It should be noted
that this discretion to make an exception to the general rule
of exclusion does not apply in civil cases.
Appeal
The new evidence rule restates the majority view that an
appeal does not render evidence of the underlying conviction
inadmissible.5 6 An appeal is viewed as insufficient grounds to
attack the presumption of correctness that attends judicial
proceedings. 25 7 The pendency of an appeal, however, may be
admitted as a qualifying circumstance.
258
RULE 610: RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OR OPINIONS

Wyoming Rule of Evidence 610 proscribes the use of religious beliefs and opinions to impair or enhance the credibility of a witness. The matter has not been raised in a Wyoming case, but the new rule is consistent with the prevailing
practice elsewhere. 259 The old common law belief that an
atheist was incompetent to testify because he was incapable
of taking the oath had been abandoned in most jurisdictions
26
prior to the enactment of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence. 0
In the few jurisdictions which still permit impeachment by
evidence of religious beliefs, the cases are old and the doctrine
has not been recently tested. 26 ' The notion behind the common law rule of incapacity was that an oath before testifying
would mean nothing to a person unless he believed in a devine being who would punish false swearing.26 2 Consequently,
the only test of religious belief which was relevant under the
common law was whether the witness believed in a God who
2
would punish untruthful statements. 63
256.

United States v. Soles, 482 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1027

(1973).
257. Newman v. United States, 331 F.2d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1964).
258.

RULE 610. RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OR OPINIONS

Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not
admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature his credibility
is impaired or enhanced.

259.
260.

Annot., 95 A.L.R. 723 (1935).
MCCORMICK § 48, at 100.

261.
262.
263.

Annot., 95 A.L.R. 723 (1935); MCCORMICK § 48, at 101.
MCCORMICK § 61, at 141.
MCCORMICK § 48, at 102.
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Under the new rule, evidence of religious beliefs is inadmissible to test credibility as well as competency. 26 ' This is
harmonious with many state constitutions and statutes which
provide that witnesses are not rendered incompetent due to
their religious beliefs.2 6 These provisions not only make religious beliefs irrelevant to competency but also prevent ex26 6
amination into such matters for purposes of impeachment.
The Constitution of the State of Wyoming provides that "no
person shall be rendered incompetent ... to serve as a witness . . . because of his opinion on any matter of religious be267
lief whatever."
The common law rule of incapacity would no doubt run
into serious obstacles today with the freedom of religion provisions of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the due process and equal protection provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 268 Today we recognize that even
an atheist may have the strictest sense of moral obligation to
speak the truth 269 Thus, religious beliefs are not relevant to
credibility because there is no reason to believe that a lack of
faith in God's avenging wrath for untruths reflects in any way
on the veracity of a witness. 27 0 The new rule of evidence is
27 1
consistent with the prior Wyoming law on this topic.
Evidence of religious beliefs to show bias or interest of a
witness, however is admissible,27 2 as well as evidence which
bears on a substantial issue in the case. The sole restraint is
that the judge must determine that the relevance of such evidence outweighs the interest of privacy and the danger of
prejudice .27
264.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

271.

ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING
(1973).

THE NEW

FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

63

Annot., 95 A.L.R. 723 (1935).
Id.
WYO. CONST. art. I, § 18.
MCCORMICK § 63, at 141.
WIGMORE § 936, at 722.

MCCORMICK § 48, at 102. Some commentators feel the new rule is overbroad as
some religious beliefs may be relevant to credibility such as when a fundamental
tenet is that the government is a false God which should be fought and disobeyed.
Clearly, under these circumstances, the trustworthiness of the witness' testimony
would be in doubt. REDDEN & SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL 89 (Supp. 1976).
WYO. CONST. art. I, § 18.

272. Tucker v. Reil, 51 Ariz. 357, 77 P.2d 203, 206 (1938).
273.

MCCORMICK § 48, at 101.
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611: MODE AND ORDER OF INTERROGATION
AND PRESENTATION

274

Discretion is the keynote in matters concerning the mode
and order of interrogation and the presentation of evidence
under Wyoming Rule of Evidence 611. The new rule is harmonious with prior Wyoming practice,275 and it vests extensive discretion in the trial judge to determine the extent of
cross-examination, the scope of rebuttal and surrebuttal, who
shall open and close and when narrative answers are permissible.276 Further, there is room for innovative rulings by the

277
judge so long as no prejudice results to a party or witness.
The objectives expressed in Rule 6 11(a) are the ascertainment
of truth, the efficient use of time and protection of witnesses
from harrassment and undue embarrassment. Although the
trial judge will be reversed only where he has abused his discretion, he should never lightly rule on the mode and order
28
of interrogation or the presentation of evidence.

Wyoming decisions prior to the enactment of the new
rules of evidence demonstrate the wide discretion vested in
the trial judge over such matters as reopening a trial279 admiting rebuttal evidence2 0 and deviations from the normal order
of presenting evidence. 28' In the normal case, the manner and
order of presenting evidence is determined by legal conven274.

RULE 611. MODE AND ORDER OF INTERROGATION AND PRESENTATION
(a) Control by court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the
mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1)
make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the
truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
(b) Scope of cross-examination. Cross-examination should be limited to the
subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of
the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.
(c) Leading questions. Leading questions should not be used on the direct
examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop his testimony. Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party
calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions.
275. Benham Const. Co. v. Rentz, 69 Wyo. 176, 238 P.2d 927 (1951); New Hampshire
Fire Ins. Co. of Manchester v. Boler, 55 Wyo. 530, 102 P.2d 39 (1940); Boyle v.
Mountford, 39 Wyo. 141, 270 P. 537 (1928); Hunt v. City of Laramie, 26 Wyo.
160, 181 P. 137 (1919).
276. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 63
(1973).
277. WEINSTEIN
611 [01], at 16.
278. Id. at 20.
279. Wyoming Stockmen's Loan Co. v. Johnston, 33 Wyo. 457, 240 P. 449, 452 (1925).
280. State v. Alexander, 78 Wyo. 324 P.2d 831 (1958), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 850
(1960); Hunt v. City of Laramie, 26 Wyo. 160, 181 P. 137 (1919).
281. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. of Manchester v. Boler, 55 Wyo. 530, 102 P.2d 39
(1940).
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tions and the trial strategy of the parties. 2 The judge's discretionary power is typically exercised only when triggered
by unusual circumstances or a request from a party for a ruling. 2M His role is neither that of an advocate nor that of an
observer. Rule 611(a) aids him in controlling the trial by giving him flexibility over evidentiary matters, thereby promoting the efficient ascertainment of truth and fair treatment of
witnesses.
Scope of Cross-Examination
Rule 611(b) retains the traditional rule restricting crossexamination to the scope of the preceding direct examination
but accords the trial judge wide latitude in permitting additional inquiry if warranted. This is a modification of the socalled "restrictive view" of cross examination, wherein only
matters that have been "opened-up" or inquired into on direct
examination may be explored on cross-examination. Under
the "restrictive view," inquiry into matters outside the scope
of the direct must wait until it is the opposing party's turn to
call witnesses. The "restrictive view" of cross examination
prevailed in the federal courts and in numerous state jurisdictions prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 2 4 The alternative view of cross examination, the socalled "wide-open" view, permits cross examination as to any
admissible evidence within the knowledge of the witness.2
The discretion accorded to the trial judge to permit crossexamination into matters beyond the scope of the direct examination is not a change in prior law.2 8 Such discretion is
designed to prevent confusion, complication and protection
of the case.2 8 When such additional inquiry is allowed, the
examiner must proceed as if on direct examination, meaning
he cannot use leading questions.
The value of the "restrictive view" of cross-examination
is that it promotes the orderly presentation of evidence and
allows a party to control his own case., 8 The value of the
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

WEINSTEIN
611 [01],at 15.
Id.
Federal Rules-Advisory Committee Notes-FED. RULE EvID. 611, Adv. Comm.
Note, subdivision (b).
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 65.
REDDEN & SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, at 198 (1975).
Id. at 201.
Finch v. Weiner, 145 A. 31, 32 (Conn. 1929).
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"wide-open" view, on the other hand, is that it permits freer
developments of relevant evidence.2 9 It is more economical in
time and energy, since there is little opportunity for dispute
in its application, as compared to the "restrictive view" which
engenders frequent objection and dispute on the question of
what points were actually raised on direct-examination.
Although Rule 6"11(a)(3) requires the trial judge to protect witnesses from questions which go beyond the scope of
proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy or humiliate, the judge cannot foreclose questions designed to discredit
the witness.2 90 Curtailment of cross-examination is a matter
of discretion with the court, but in criminal cases he must
keep in mind the defendant's right to confront witnesses
against him as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the
United States Constitutions 1 and by section eleven of article
one of the Wyoming Constitution.29 2 In civil cases, curtailment of cross-examination may amount to abuse of discre2 93
tion if the excluded evidence was highly probative.
In Wyoming, the trial judge is vested with substantial discretion in controlling the manner and latitude of cross-examination and will be reversed only for flagrant abuse of that discretion.294 Generally, wide latitude is given to a cross-examiner
when questioning an adverse witness. 29 The trial judge has
control over cross-examination and decides which tactics are
6
improper.2
The extent to which a defendant waives his privilege
against self-incrimination by taking the stand is not specified
in Rule 611, although Wyoming Rule of Evidence 104(d) provides that an accused who testifies only as to preliminary
matters may not be cross-examined as to other issues. 97 When
the defendant testifies on the merits of one of the issues, it is
not clear whether he may be cross-examined on any relevant
facts of the case or only on those related to the issues opened
289.

Federal Rules-Advisory Committee Notes-FED. RULE EvID. 611, citing Report
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, subdivision (b).
290. Alford v. U.S., 282 U.S. 687, 694 (1931).
291. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
292. WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 10.

293.

Reilly v. Pinkens, 338 U.S. 269, 275 (1949).

294.
295.
296.

Benham Const. Co. v. Rentz, supra note 18.
In re Morton, 428 P.2d 725, 733 (Wyo. 1967).
Valdez v. Glenn, 79 Wyo. 53, 330 P.2d 309, 311 (1958), reh. denied, 332 P.2d

297.

WRE 104(d).

1119 (1958).
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up on direct. Tucker v. United States298 stands as support for
the later view, i.e., that each party has the right to restrain
cross-examination to the subjects brought up on direct-examination. However, a contrasting view has been expressed in
Johnson v. United States, 29 9 where the United States Supreme
Court, citing Wigmore,3 00 said defendants' " 'voluntary offer
of testimony upon any fact is a waiver as to all other relevant
facts, because of the necessary connection between all.' "301
Under either view, however, the defendant, before taking the
stand, should be entitled to a ruling on the extent to which
the court will find that he waived his privilege against selfincrimination by testifying to less than all of the issues on direct .302
When a witness is not a party in the litigation, the rule is
somewhat different. Since a non-party witness must take the
stand when called, it cannot be said that he thereby waives
his privilege against self-incrimination. Waiver will be found
only if he fails to claim his privilege 0 3 and answers the crossexaminer's incriminating questions.
Leading Questions
A leading question is one which suggests or indicates to
the witness the answer which the questioner wants. 304 Wyomining Rule of Evidence 611(c) reaffirms the prior Wyoming
law which viewed the suggestive powers of leading questions
as undesirable on direct examination, except for preliminary
matters 3°5 where necessary to develop a witness' testimony.
For example, leading questions may be put to a child witness
on direct-examination, 30 6 particularly if she is timid and em30 7
barrassed by the nature of the questions.
Rule 611(c) conforms to traditional practice 38 in making
the use of leading questions on cross-examination a matter of
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

5 F.2d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 1925); see also Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S.
304, 315 (1900).
318 U.S. 189 (1943).
8 WIGMORE § 2276(2).
Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 195 (1943).
WEINSTEIN t 611 [03] ,at 42.
Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
MOORE § 611.31, at 189.
Jenkins v. State, 22 Wyo. 34, 134 P. 260 (1913), reh- denied, 135 P. 749 (1913).
Rhodes v. State, 462 P.2d 722 (Wyo. 1969).
Antelope v. United States, 185 F.2d 174 (10th Cir. 1950).
Federal Rules-Advisory Committee Notes-FED. RULE EVID. 611, Adv. Comm.
Note, subdivision (c).
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right in most cases. The underlying rationale is that witnesses
are usually uncooperative towards the cross-examiner, and
therefore the proponent needs to be able to lead in order to
obtain the relevant facts known to the witness. The term "ordinarily" found in the rule qualifies its scope and makes it
possible for a judge to disallow leading questions when the inquiry is cross-examination in form only. One example would
be the case of an insured who is named as the defendant in a
subrogation action but who proves to be friendly to the
plaintiff. If he is cooperative and helpful to the plaintiff, the
underlying justification for leading questions on cross-examination is gone. The new rule perpetuates prior Wyoming law
which allowed one to call the opposing party 3 9 in civil cases
and to examine him as if on cross-examination, i.e., by means
of leading questions. The Wyoming courts have stated that
the true test of the right to cross-examine the adverse party is
whether the party is in fact adverse to the one calling him.310
Similarly, one commentator argues that an express finding of
hostility is necessary when the examiner wants to lead a witness under the hostile witness exception of Rule 611(c).31 1
Control over the use of leading questions was placed largely
in the discretion of the Wyoming courts even before the adoption of the new rules of evidence.31
In permitting a party to lead any "witness identified with
an adverse party", 313 the new rule expands the group which
formerly consisted of the officers, directors, agents, and employees of the adverse party.314
RULE 612: WRITING OR OBJECT USED TO REFRESH
MEMORY 815
Rule 612 of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence is patterned
after the federal rule. The rule codifies the settled doctrine,
309.
310.

WYO. STAT. § 1-12-103 (1977).
Husted v. French Creek Ranch, Inc., 79 Wyo. 307, 333 P.2d 948, 953 (1959);
Huber v. Thomas, 45 Wyo. 440, 19 P.2d 1042,1045 (1933); State Bank v. Bagley

Bros. 44 Wyo. 244, 11 P.2d 572 (1932).
311.
312.

ROTHSTEIN, RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 252 (1975).
DeBaca v. State, 404 P.2d 738, 739 (Wyo. 1965); Husted v. French Creek Ranch,
Inc., supra note 53, at 953; Huber v. Thomas, supra note 53, at 1045.

313. WRE 611(c).
314.
315.

WYo. R. Civ. P. 43(b).
RULE 612. WRITING OR OBJECT USED TO REFRESH MEMORY
(a) While testifying. If, while testifying, a witness uses a writing or object to
refresh his memory, an adverse party is entitled to have the writing or object pro-
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both at the federal level 316 and in Wyoming, 31 7 that a witness
may use writings or other documents to refresh his memory
while he is testifying. When interrogating a witness, counsel
may hand him a writing to inspect for the purpose of refreshing his recollection so that his testimony is based upon his
present memory revived and not upon the writing used to revive it.318 It is discretionary with the trial judge whether a
witness is allowed to use a memorandum to revive his memory. 319 Generally the trial judge will accept the witness' claim
of a lapse in memory to allow the use of a writing.32 0 However, the trial judge will not allow the witness to testify from
a prepared script.3'
The purpose of Rule 612 is to promote the credibility
and memory of a witness.3 2 Traditional doctrine held that
the opponent had no right of access to the writing when it
was used before a witness took the stand.3 3 This practice,
however, was thought by some commentators to be too re-

316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

321.
322.
323.

duced at the trial, hearing, or deposition in which the witness is testifying.
(b) Before testifying. If, before testifying, a witness uses a writing or object
to refresh his memory for the purpose of testifying and the court in its discretion
determines that the interests of justice so require, an adverse party is entitled to
have the writing or object produced, if practicable, at the trial, hearing, or deposition in which the witness is testifying.
(c)
Terms and conditions of production and use. A party entitled to have a
writing or object produced under this rule is entitled to inspect it, to cross-examine
the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which relate to
the testimony of the witness. If production of the writing or object at the trial,
hearing, or deposition is impracticable, the court may order it made available for
inspection. If it is claimed that the writing or object contains matters not related to
the subject matter of the testimony, the court shall examine the writing, or object
in camera, excise any portions not so related, and order delivery of the remainder
to the party entitled thereto. Any portion withheld over objections shall be preserved and made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. If a writing or object is not produced, made available for inspection, or delivered pursuant
to order under this rule, the court shall make any order justice requires, but in
criminal cases if the prosecution elects not to comply, the order shall be one striking the testimony or, if the court in its discretion determines that the interests of
justice so require, declaring a mistrial.
MCCORMICK § 9, at 15.
See Opie v. State, 389 P.2d 684, 691 (Wyo. 1964); Jenkins v. State, 22 Wyo. 34,
134 P. 260, 264 (1913), reh. denied, 22 Wyo. 34, 135 P. 749 (1913); Kahn v. Traders' Ins. Co., 4 Wyo. 419, 34 P. 1059 (1893).
9, at 15.
MCCORMICK
Id. at 19;see also United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 191 (4th Cir. 1975)..
612 [011, at 612-10, notes that since counsel will have interviewed
WEINSTEIN
the witness before calling him to testify and such interview may have revived his
memory by the use of memoranda, it is often difficult for the judge to determine
if the witness remembers something of his own recall or based on pretrial preparation. Therefore, most trial judges will allow claims of loss of memory and let witnesses rely on writings to refresh their memory.
A typical situation where writings are commonly used to refresh memory is
where considerable time has elapsed between the occurance of the event and the
trial, or where numerous details are involved. See, e.g., Kahn v. Traders' Ins. Co.,
supra note 317.
N.L.R.B. v. Fed. Dairy Co., 297 F.2d 487, 489 (1st Cir. 1962); Goings v. United
States, 377 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1967).
WRE 612, Wyo. Comm. Note.
McCORMICK § 9, at 17.
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strictive 2 4 and today acceptance of that view can be seen in
the increasing number of courts which are allowing production when a writing is used to refresh recollection before tesWhen a writing is used while testifying, production
tifying.
of the opponent is mandatory.3 6 Use of a
benefit
for the
writing before testifying on the other hand does not automatically require that access be afforded to the opponent.
The trial judge is given discretion in this regard and only
upon a determination that the "interests of justice so require"
and if practicable will he order the writing produced.32
ProcedurePursuant to Rule 612
The procedure necessary to implement Rule 612 is substantially the same as that practiced in the federal courts.
When a writing is used to refresh a witness' memory, the adverse party may have the writing produced at the hearing,m
inspect the writing, cross-examine the witness on it and introduce into evidence those portions of the writing that relate to
the witness' testimony." While the adverse party may introduce portions of the writing as evidence, the party whose wit0
ness has used the writing to refresh his memory may not. 3
Portions of the writing may be read to the jury if it is deemed
pertinent and non-prejudicial. The better practice, however,
is to have the witness read to himself those parts of the document necessary to revive his memory. This prevents the jury
from hearing evidence which is ordinarily inadmissible.3 1
The federal rule does not say what qualifies as a "writing"
under the rule. However, it is well established that practically
anything may qualify.3 3 Also absent in the federal rule is any
324.
325.
326.
327.

WIGMORE § 762, at 140;MCCORMICK § 9, at 17-18.
FED. R. EVID. 612, Adv. Comm. Note.
FED. R. EVID. 612; WRE 612(b). For a discussion of this in criminal cases see infra
under subheading Application in Criminal Cases.
WRE 612(b). The reason the rule is discretionary with the trial judge and not mandatory is that permitting the adverse party to require the production of writings
used before testifying could result in "fishing expeditions" among the papers of the
party calling the witness. FED. R. EVID. 612, Report of House Comm. on the Jud.
It should be noted that both the federal rule and the Wyoming rule use the
phrase "for the purpose of testifying." This is to safeguard against using the rule as
a "wholesale exploration of an opposing party's files and to insure that access is
limited only to those writings which may fairly be said in fact to have an impact
upon the testimony of the witness." FED. R. EVID. 612, Adv. Comm. Note.

328. WRE 612(a) & (b).
329. WRE 612(c).
330.
331.
332.

Markel Service, Inc. v. Nat'l Farm Lines, 426 F.2d 1123, 1128 (10th Cir. 1970).
New Mexico Say. & Loan Ass'n v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 454 F.2d 328, 336-37
(10th Cir. 1972).
MCCORMICK § 9, at 16. See FED. R. Eva). 1001(1) and WRE 1001(1) for the
broad definition of "writings." See also United States v. Faulkner, 538 F.2d 724,
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indication whether "objects" are included within the definition of "writings"; nevertheless, the rule has generally been
To make it clear that "obinterpreted to include them.
jects" are permissible to stimulate present memory, the Wyoming rule specifically incorporates the term "object." The
memory of a witness may be refreshed by writings or papers
which themselves are inadmissible .m The writings need not
have been written or prepared by the witness himself 335 nor
must the document be an original or be prepared contemporaniously with the event testified to. 336 This liberal practice
on what constitutes a writing for purposes of refreshing recollection is justified on the basis that the writing itself is not offered as evidence. The testimony elicited by the witness who
used the writing to jog his memory is the proffered evidence. 33
It is also justified on the ground that the opposing party can
demand to inspect it.
An important distinction must be made between "present
recollection revived" and "past recollection recorded." Letting a witness revive his present recollection is the proper aim
of Rule 612. The phrase "past recollection recorded" refers
to testimony which is based on what the writing says and not
on the present memory of the witness. Such "past recollection recorded" may not be introduced into evidence under
Rule 612, because the evidence consists of what the writing
says and not what the witness says. If the witness' memory is
not revived by a writing, the document may be admitted into
evidence if it meets the test of recorded recollection as required in Wyoming Rule of Evidence 803(5). 33 It should be
noted that the line between using the writing to aid memory
and relying on it as a correct record of past events is sometimes fuzzy.3 9 The distinction between these two uses of a
writing is important. In the instance of "present recollection

333.
334.

727 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976). The kinds of writings permissible to refresh memory are not without limit, however. For example, a witness
should not be allowed to use testimonial notes on the stand so that he reads his
answers rather than responds freely from memory to the questions asked. N.L.R.B.
v. Fed. Dairy Co., supra note 321.
MCCORMICK § 9, at 16.
United States v. Baratta,'397 F.2d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.

335.

Jenkins v. State, supra note 317.

1045 (1969).

336. Johnston v. Earl, 313 F.2d 686, 688 (9th Cir. 1962).
10 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 612.03, at 204 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter
cited as MOORE].
338. See also FED. R. EviD. 803(5).
339. MCCORMICK § 9, at 18.
337.
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revived" the witness can be cross-examined as to his perception, ability to remember and whether his memory is consistent with the instrument used to revive it. Opposing counsel
cannot, however, cross-examine the writing when the witness
relies on it as an accurate representation of the events in
question .340
Two safeguards exist which help prevent a witness from
claiming revived memory when in fact he has none. First, the
trial judge has broad discretion in the matter. He may reject a
witness' claim that the writing revives his memory or that he
lacks sufficient recollection,3 41 or the judge may decide that
the danger of undue suggestion outweighs any value the writing has in stimulating a witness' memoryY32 Second, the adverse party may have the writing produced for his inspection,
cross-examine the witness on it and present it to the jury if
he so desires.' 3
Under the new Wyoming rule, if production of the writing or object at the trial, hearing or deposition is impracticable,
the court may order it made available for inspection. m The
federal rule does not explicitly state this, but the requirement
in the rule that production be made upon request of an adverse party implies that if production is not convenient the
judge, in his discretion, may order it made available for inspection. This difference between the Wyoming Rule and federal rule is minor, but it does demonstrate Wyoming's attempt
to be more complete in spelling out the terms of the rule. In
cases of doubt, trial judges may be more inclined to construe
the Wyoming rule broader than the federal rule on this detail
because the procedure is more specific under Wyoming's version of Rule 612.
Another feature of the procedure under Rule 612 is the
in camera examinations by the judge of a document objected
to on the grounds that it does not relate to the subject matter
of the testimony.36 If an adverse party does not think a writing relates to the testimony being elicited, he can demand
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

MOORE § 612.02, at 199.
MCCORMICK § 9, at 19.
rd. at 17.
612 [01 ],at 612-13.
WEINSTEIN
WRE 612(c).
WRE 612(c).
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that the judge view it in chambers before the witness is allowed to use it in court. The judge has no discretion in this
demand, he must comply under the rule. If the judge determines that any portions of the writing do not relate to the
testimony, he is required to excise those portions and return
the remainder to the party entitled to it.4 6 If an excised portion is objected to it is to be preserved and made available to
the appellate court in case of appeal. 347
Rule 612 leaves to the trial judge's discretion what measures to take when a writing is not produced as ordered. The
rule only requires that the judge "make any order justice requires." 8 An exception to this exists in criminal cases when
the prosecution elects not to comply. In such case the order
shall be one striking the testimony or declaring a mistrial, if
the court, in its discretion, determines that the interests of
justice so require. 9 The reason for the exception stems from
the Jencks Act 3m which finds application in the production
of documents relied on by witnesses in criminal cases.
Application in Criminal Cases
The most significant difference between Wyoming Rule
of Evidence 612 and the federal rule is the limitation of federal Rule 612 by the Jencks Act.3 51 The Wyoming version of
Rule 612 does not so limit the rule's application.
In 1957, the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of Jencks v. United States,- 2 where it held that a criminal
defendant had the right to inspect reports of government witnesses and that it was not necessary for the defendant to
show that the reports were inconsistent with the witness' testimony, as long as they were shown to relate to the same subject matter. The opinion was highly criticized as giving to a
criminal defendant too much access to government files. Con346.
347.
348.

WRE 612(c).
WRE 612(c).
WRE 612(c). Cf. Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231 (1961), reh. denied. 368

U.S. 979 (1962). See also WEINSTEIN $ 612 [05]. FED. R. EvD. 612, Adv. Comm.
Note, suggests available sanctions are contempt, dismissal and finding issues against

the offender. It is also suggested that Rule 37(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil
Procedure and Rule 18(h) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure be consulted for appropriate sanctions.

349. WRE 612(c).
350. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
351. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
352. 353 U.S. 657,666 (1957).
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gress responded by passing the Jencks Act. This Act provides
that in a criminal prosecution brought by the United States
the defendant cannot require the production of government
statements until after the government's witnesses have testified on direct examination in the trial concerning the subject
matter which relates to those statements. 3 This rule is a reflection of the traditional view that in criminal cases little discovery is allowed. The Act further provides that the term
"statement" means a written statement made by a government witness which is signed, adopted or otherwise acknowledged by him, a recorded record of a substantially verbatim
recital of an oral statement made by the government witness
which was made contemporaneously with the oral statement,
or a statement of a government witness made to a grand
jury. 354 Since the purpose of the Jencks Act is limited to making available only those statements which a criminal defendant
may use to impeach a government witness, it was necessary,
therefore, that the term "statement" be defined narrowly. 3 5
A troublesome question is presented: if federal Rule 612
does not, by its language, allow an adverse party the right to
have a writing used to refresh memory before testifying produced until "at the hearing", why bother to restrict Rule
612's application by the Jencks Act? One possible answer is
that the language "to have the writing produced at the hearing" should not literally apply, so that an adverse party in a
civil action is entitled to production before trial when the
witness uses it to refresh his memory before trial. This interpretation would clearly make the Jencks Act restrictive on
the federal rule's application in criminal cases. However, this
explanation is unsupported by the language of the rule itself
or its legislative history.356
Protection of a criminal defendant's right to see statements at trial which a government witness relied on before
trial is a better explanation of why federal Rule 612 is subject to the Jencks Act. The Act states that a criminal defendant shall be allowed access to such statements." 7 Rule 612
353. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) & (b) (1970).
354. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1970).

355. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 349 (1959).
356. FED. R. EVID. 612, Report of House Comm. on the Jud. See also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942), overruled on other grounds, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).

357. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1970).
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makes such production discretionary with the trial judge. In
this aspect the exception of the Jencks Act to federal Rule
612 actually broadens the rule in criminal cases.
Wyoming Rule 612 was drafted without the exception
imposed by the Jencks Act. The Committee Note states that
the purpose of Wyoming Rule 612 is the same as Rule 18(c)
of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure-to promote
credibility and memory.35 8 Rule 18(c) is Wyoming's version
of the Jencks Act.3 9 Since Wyoming's Rule 612 does not embody the Jencks Act exception, it would appear that it is narrower in application than the federal rule.
The Jencks Act exception to federal Rule 612 also acts to
broaden the federal rule in criminal cases by requiring production when statements, used for any purpose, relate to a
witness' testimony.3 60 Rule 612 only allows production when
the statements are used to refresh memory. Again, it appears
that the absence of the Jencks Act exception to Wyoming
Rule 612 serves to restrict the rule in Wyoming. It may be argued, though, that the omission of the Jencks Act exception
from the Wyoming rule was intended to broaden the rule's
applicability, not restrict it. The Committee Note bears evidence to such a proposition.36 ' If this was the intent, then
Rule 612 should supersede those portions of Rule 18(c) of
the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure which restrict
Rule 612's broadening effects but not those portions which
are broader than 612's language. The omission of the Jencks
Act exception indeed does broaden the Wyoming Rule with
regard to what may be produced, since it is not restrained by
the qualified definition of the term "statement" found in the
Jencks Act. 362 In addition, the language of Rule 612 states
only that production cannot be required until the hearing or
trial. It may be argued then that production can be demanded once the trial or hearing begins even though the witness,
whose writing is sought to be produced, has not yet testified.
Hence, if on the first day of trial, a party demands production
of a writing which a particular witness intends to use when
he testifies on the fourth day of trial, the party is entitled to
358.

WRE 612, Wyo. Comm. Note.

359.
360.
361.
362.

DeLuna v. State, 501 P.2d 1021,1023 (1972).
18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1970).
WRE 612, Wyo. Comm. Note.
18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1970).
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have it produced. The Jencks Act would not allow production
until the witness had already testified.36 3 This represents
another area in criminal cases where the Wyoming rule would
be broader than the federal rule.
RULE 613: PRIOR STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES 3 64
The new Wyoming Rule 613 is a verbatim copy of Rule
613 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The rule is designed to
test the veracity of a witness' testimony given at trial by allowing the cross-examiner to question the witness about prior
statements he made without first showing the statement to
the witness.
The only requirements the cross-examiner
must comply with are to let opposing counsel see the prior
statement on request and give the witness a chance to explain
or deny it."
When a witness testifies in a case, he may say things on
the stand that contradict or do not mesh with what he may
have previously said orally or in a writing. Under traditional
practice, opposing counsel could always use such discrepancies
to impeach the witness even though the prior statement would
be inadmissible as hearsay. 67 If opposing counsel did make
use of a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the witness,
he had to lay a proper foundation before doing so. 368 This requirement was based on the so-called Queen's Case rule, dating back to 1820.3 9 Under that rule, the statement had to be
revealed to the witness and the cross-examiner had to ask him
whether he remembered making it by describing the time,
place and circumstances under which the alleged statement
had been made--all before the cross-examiner could use the
statement to impeach the witness. The purposes for the rule
363.
364.

365.
366.

18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1970).
RULE 613. PRIOR STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES
(a) Examining witness concerning prior statement. In examining a witness
concerning a prior statement made by him, whether written or not, the statement
need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to him at that time, but on request
the same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel.
(b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness. Extrinsic
evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the
witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite
party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does not apply to admissions of a partyopponent as defined in Rule 801(d)(2).
WRE 613(a).
WRE 613(b).

367.

MCCORMICK § 34, at 67.

368.
369.

Sims v. State, 530 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 (Wyo. 1975).
2 Brod. & Bing. 284, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820).
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were to refresh the witness' memory, to avoid unfair surprise,
to save time (as an admission by the witness, so that further
independent proof would be unnecessary), and to give the
witness a chance to explain the inconsistency.37 However, a
clever witness could use this forewarning to good effect and
modify his story by the degree necessary to save his testimony.
This advantage given to a witness presented a serious obstacle to the cross-examiner. It was so menacing that England
abolished the rule only thirty-four years after its introduction. 37'1 The Queen's Case rule has not been so easy to overcome in the United States, however. It is still in effect in a
majority of jurisdictions. 372 Wyoming was included in the list
of states that adhered to the Queen's Case rule until the
adoption of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence and Rule 613.
Beginning in 1875, the Wyoming Supreme Court pronounced
that a foundation had to be laid by asking the witness about
the prior inconsistent statement before he could be impeached
by it. 373 This rule has been followed ever since in Wyoming,
being explicitly affirmed as the correct practice as recently as
1975.174 The foundation requirement even found expression
in Section 1-143 of the Wyoming Statutes.7 5 With the adoption of Rule 613 in Wyoming, though, this procedure is no
longer required. Rule 1102 of the new Wyoming Rules of
Evidence specifically states that all statutes in conflict with
the new rules are superseded, including Section 1-143.
ProcedurePursuant to Rule 613
The procedure to be followed under Wyoming Rule 613
should be the same as that under the federal rule. Rule 613
governs the fundamental requirements for the introduction
of evidence of prior inconsistent statements for impeachment
purposes. As has already been seen, Rule 613 abolishes the
Queen's Case rule. 376 It declares that a prior statement by a
370.

371.

MCCORMICK § 37, at 72. This rule was also thought to be necessary as part of the
"best evidence" rule, requiring production of the original document when its contents were sought to be proved. However, McCormick explains that this notion was
wrong for two reasons. See MCCORMICK § 28, at 56.
MCCORMICK § 28, at 56.

372. WEINSTEIN
373.
374.

613 [02], at 613-8.

Dayton v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 1 Wyo. 263, 266 (1875).
Sims v. State, supra note 368; see also Mares v. State, 500 P.2d 530, 536 (Wyo.
1972); Hawkins v. B. F. Walker, Inc., 426 P.2d 427, 430 (Wyo. 1967); Friesen v.

Schmelzel, 78 Wyo. 1,318 P.2d 368, 370 (1957).
375.

WYO. STAT. § 1-143 (1957), (superseded by WRE 1102).

376. FED. R. EvID. 613, Adv. Comm. Note, subdivision (a).
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witness, whether oral or written, need not be shown to the
witness at the time he is cross-examined on the prior statement.3 77 To protect against unwarranted insinuations that a
statement has been made when the fact is to the contrary,
disclosure of the statement to opposing counsel at his request
is required,3 78 thereby allowing counsel to object to the statement at the time it is sought to be introduced. 1 9
It is further provided that the witness be given an opportunity to explain or deny the prior inconsistent statement
and the party who called the witness be given an opportunity
to interrogate him on it.m This procedure does not outline a
time sequence to be followed, and the trial judge may allow
the procedure to unfold as he deems appropriate.3 l If, however, the trial judge determines that the "interest of justice
otherwise require," he can deny the witness an opportunity
to explain and opposing counsel the right to interrogate
him .382

The change from the old practice in Wyoming to the new
practice under Rule 613 shifts the focus from warning the
witness to surprising him. In civil cases, where discovery is
fully utilized, the changes will probably not be appreciable,
because presumably the witness will be cognizant of any past
inconsistent statements. 3 8 In criminal cases, however, the
change increases the chance that examination with prior inconsistent statements before disclosure will expose collusive
witnesses to the jury.3
It has been argued that Rule 613 gives too great a club to
the cross-examiner, since he can delay connecting the witness
to the prior inconsistent statement so that, by the time he exposes the inconsistency, the effect on the witness' credibility
is devastating.3 It has also been said that if the witness has a
377.
378.
379.
380.

WRE 613(a).
WRE 613(a). See FED. R. EVID. 613, Adv. Comm. Note, subdivision (b).
WEINSTEIN
613 [03], at 613-15. The objection would be that authentication
and best evidence requirements have not been met.
WRE 613(b).

381. MCCORMICK § 37, at 75 n.64.
382. WRE 613(b); WEINSTEIN . 613 [02], at 613-9, notes that:
[T] he "interests of justice" clause permits the admission of statements
which under the orthodox rule were completely barred if the party did
not learn of the prior inconsistent statement until after the witness
ceased being amenable to the court's jurisdiction since the foundation
questions could not then be asked.

383. WEINSTEIN
384.
385.

613 [02], at 613-19.

FED. R. EViD. 613, Adv. Comm. Note, subdivision (b).
Note, Modification of the Foundational Requirement for Impeaching Witnesses:
California Evidence Code Section 770, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 210, 219 (1966).
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legitimate explanation, any attempt he makes to explain the
incongruity will be looked upon as suspect by the jury. 38
These objections to the operation of Rule 613 are not well
founded. Any danger that the cross-examiner's effective use
of a prior statement may unduly hurt the witness's credibility
is outweighed by the freedom given to the cross-examiner to
get at the truth of the witness' assertions. Rule 613 safeguards
the dangers of an overzealous cross-examiner by allowing the
other side to see the statement and rehabilitate the witness.
The witness himself can revive any lost credibility by truthfully explaining any seeming discrepancy, especially if the
witness is believable and the jury has no reason to think he is
being less than totally honest. Finally, the argument against
the application of Rule 613 hinges on the assumption that
the jury is simple enough to put less reliance on a witness'
testimony solely because of a mix-up in his story, without
taking other factors into consideration. If the cross-examiner
tries to unduly discredit the witness on a past statement he
has made, the jury is apt to react unfavorably to the crossexaminer rather than to the witness. If the witness's story is
weak, then, in the interests of truth-seeking, the cross-examiner should be allowed to cast doubt on his story without
first warning him.
Limitations of Rule 613
Rule 613 is expressly made inapplicable to admissions of
a party-opponent.8 7 It is also to be distinguished from other
situations where other rules of evidence apply. For example,
Rule 613 does not apply to impeachment of a witness by
prior inconsistent conduct. 388 Nor does the rule defeat the
application of the "best evidence" rule in Rule 1002 of the
Wyoming Rules of Evidence.38 9 Rule 613 is designed to allow
prior inconsistent statements to be used to impeach a witness
and is not intended to allow the statement itself to be admitted as substantive evidence which is the aim of Rule 1002.
While Rule 613 governs the admission of prior inconsistent
statements used for impeachment purposes, such statements
386.
387.
388.
389.

613 (02], at 613-11.
WEINSTEIN
WRE 613(b). The provision governing party-opponent admissions is WYO. R. Evm.
801(d)(2).
FED. R. EvID. 613, Adv. Comm. Note, subdivision (b).
FED. R. EvID. 613, Adv. Comm. Note, subdivision (a).
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may be independently admitted to prove the truth of the
matter asserted under Rule 801(d)(1).39 0
The Advisory Committee Note accompanying Rule 613
of the federal rules states that Rule 613 does not defeat the
application of Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.9 1 Rule 26(b)(3) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil
Procedure is identical to Federal Rule 26(b)(3). That rule
says that upon request, a witness may obtain a copy of "a
statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that person,"' 92 without a showing of good
cause. Rule 26(b)(3) would appear to allow discovery of a
prior inconsistent statement in the possession of the opponent,
thus defeating the opponent's ability to use it to surprise the
witness at trial.3 3 However, the apparent conflict between
Rule 613 and Rule 26(b)(3), is not so great when the purpose
for each rule is examined. Rule 26(b)(3) is designed to allow
broad discovery in civil cases, so that the trial is a more orderly process and so that cases are more likely to be won on the
merits rather than on surprise tactics.394 The aim of Rule 613
is not to limit the wide discovery tools provided by the Rules
of Civil Procedure, but to see that a witness does not later
change his story to the advantage of the party he is testifying
for. Normally, a witness will know that he may be impeached
by a prior statement of his if he tries to modify his story at
trial. The pretrial discovery utilized will warn him of that.
Rule 613 merely aids the opponent in keeping the witness
straight in case he attempts to change his story or the discovery did not uncover a prior inconsistent statement. Hence,
while it might at first appear that the new Rule 613 overrides
Rule 26(b)(3) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, a
closer look reveals that it does not. If, during the discovery
stage of a case, a party asserts that he is privileged from re390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

WRE 801(d)(1).
FED. R. EviD. 613, Adv. Comm. Note, subdivision (a).
Wyo. R. Cry. P. 26(b)(3).
A similar situation is presented in criminal cases when the defendant wants to see
prior statements he has made. See WYO. R. CRIM. P. 18(a).
In MOORE § 613.02, at 212-13, it is noted that if a witness requests a copy of his
prior statement before trial, he may get it under FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). But, at
the trial itself, the adverse party may, under FED. R. Evm. 613(a), cross-examine
without showing the prior statement to the witness. Consequently, the time of
requesting the prior statement becomes very important. Some federal courts have
solved this problem by ordering that the adverse party may depose the witness before giving him the prior statement. See, e.g., Parla v. Matson Navigation Co., 28
F.R.D. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Straughan v. Barge M.V.L. No. 802, 291 F. Supp.

282, 12 F.R.Serv.2d 34.13, Case 5 (S.D. Tex. April 10, 1968).
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vealing a prior statement of his opponent's witness by virtue
of Rule 613, the court should deny the assertion and require
production, unless it would in some way be clearly unfair to
to
do so. If the party wishes, though, he should be allowed
95
statement
the
disclosing
before
witness
the
depose
RULE 614: CALLING AND INTERROGATION
6
OF WITNESSES BY COURT39

The long-established practice of letting the trial judge call
and question witnesses, if in his discretion he deems it desirable or necessary, has been codified in the new Rule 614 of
the Wyoming Rules of Evidence. The Wyoming rule is patterned after Rule 614 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
language being exactly the same in both rules. The right of
the trial judge to call and question witnesses stems from the
nature of the judicial function in American courts.17 "A
judge is more than a moderator; he is charged to see that the
law is properly administered, and it is a duty which he cannot
discharge by remaining inert." 8 Rule 614 is divided into
three parts: 614(a) allows the court to call a witness; 614(b)
permits interrogation of a witness by the court; and 614(c)
deals with objections to the calling or questioning of a witness by the court.
The Calling of Witnesses by the Court
Subdivision (a) of Rule 614 allows the court, on its own
motion or at the suggestion of a party, to call witnesses ana
further provides that all parties may cross-examine such witnesses. This prerogative is well established in the federal
courts.n 9 While no case law exists in Wyoming saying a judge
may call a witness, the practice of questioning witnesses has
been acknowledged. 401 Under the old rules of evidence when
395.

MOORE § 613.02, at 212-13.

396.

RULE 614. CALLING AND INTERROGATION OF WITNESSES BY COURT
(a) Calling by Court. The court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion
of a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses
thus called.
(b) Interrogation by court. The court may interrogate witnesses, whether
called by itself or by a party.
(c) Objections. Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court or to interrogation by it may be made at the time or at the next available opportunity
when the jury is not present.
614 [01], at 614-3.
WEINSTEIN
United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 925 (2d Cir. 1945).
See United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
See Town of Douglas v. Nielsen, 409 P.2d 240, 242 (Wyo. 1965). Since a judge
could question witnesses, it may be assumed he had authority to call them, too.

397.
398.
399.
400.
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a party could not impeach his own witness, the judge was
sometimes requested by that party to call the witness so that
he could be impeached by the party originally intending to
call him. 40 1 There are good reasons for allowing the judge to
call witnesses. For one, a party avoids the association of a
witness with his side if the judge calls the witness, and in addition, the judge is not confined to the development of a case
as conceived by the parties. 402 Fairness is assured by the right
of each party to cross-examine the witness. 403 The rule also
allows the judge to call witnesses not called or requested to
be called by either side, to ensure that all the relevant facts of
40 4
a case are brought out.
The trial judge's authority to call his own witness has generally been viewed as a matter of judicial discretion rather
than a duty 4°6 and that exercise of discretion has rarely been
overturned on appeal. 406 Rule 614(a) seems to be in accord
with this position because it states that the court "may" call
witnesses.
Interrogationof Witnesses by the Court
Rule 614(b) provides that the court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party. This rule exists
to help insure the complete disclosure of all pertinent facts
which the parties themselves may have failed to bring out. A
judge may exercise his power to question witnesses when a
witness's testimony is unclear, inaccurate or misleading. 4 7 This
was the rule in Wyoming even before the adoption of Rule
614.408 It has also been said that the judge has a duty to question witnesses to bring out undisclosed facts, but the general
401.
402.
403.
404.

405.
406.
407.
408.

The old rule no longer exists by virtue of WRE 607.
FED. R. EVID. 614, Adv. Comm. Note, subdivision (a).
FED. R. EVID. 614, Adv. Comm. Note, subdivision (a).
WEINSTEIN
614 [02], at 614-6, notes that the judge's right to call witnesses
whom both sides fail to call may be particularly desirable in bench trials or where
the interests of others than the immediate parties are at stake, such as in class actions or matters involving public policy decisions. However, judges are reluctant to
call witnesses without a request from a party because they know little of a case below the surface and rely on the parties themselves to expedite the case in a thorough manner.
Another use of the power to call witnesses is to have the judge appoint an expert witness of his own choosing or one agreed upon by the parties, so that the possibility of partisan experts is avoided. This power is governed by WRE 706 rather
than Rule 614.
614 [02], at 614-7. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 54
WEINSTEIN
(1948), Justice Frankfurter argued that federal judges have a duty to call witnesses
called
who may have important knowledge about a case.
not otherwise
See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 331 F.2d 265, 273 (8th Cir. 1964).
See, e.g., United States v. Green, 429 F.2d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
See Town of Douglas v. Nielsen, supra note 390.
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view and Rule 614(b)'s position is that it is entirely discretionary with the trial judge.
The right to question witnesses by the judge is not unlimited. The judge must maintain an appearance of impartiality
at all times during the course of a trial. The judge is not to
abandon his judicial role and assume the role of advocate or
prosecutor in a criminal case. 40 9 He must be careful in questioning witnesses, for even if the questions are impartial, if
they are too extensive he may have infringed on a party's
right to a fair trial."40 The trial judge must let the jury reach
its own conclusions, and overzealous participation by a judge
during the course of a trial may prevent this.41 In addition to
the limits imposed upon the trial judge in questioning witnesses, general comments made by the judge should be impartial and kept to a minimum.41 2 If the judge's remarks or conduct favor one side of a case, it could result in prejudicial error.413
44
Reversals for improper interrogation by a judge are rare 1
since a trial judge's discretion in this area is broad. Ordinarily,
appellate courts will find that the judge did not abuse his discretion 415 or that his actions, if erroneous, did not amount to
reversible error. 4 6 But, if the appellate court finds that the
trial judge over-stepped his bounds as judicial arbiter and as417
sumed the role of advocate, the judgment will be reversed.

An interesting ancillary question regarding the application of Rule 614(b) is whether or not the word "court" as
used in the rule means "judge" or "judge and jury"? The fed409. See United States v. Barbour, 420 F.2d 1319, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
410. See, e.g., United Statesv. Brandt, 196 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1952).
411. See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 586 (10th Cir. 1961),
cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1962).
412. Deeter v. State, 500 P.2d 68, 70 (Wyo. 1972).
413. Cf. State v. Riggle, 76 Wyo. 1, 300 P.2d 349, 368 (1956), reh. denied, 76 Wyo. 1,
300 P.2d 567 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 981 (1957); see also Anderson v.
State, 27 Wyo. 345, 196 P. 1047, 1057-58 (1921), where the judge's remark to the
jury that "any attempt on the part of the defendant to settle this matter or to re.
was held error, requiring return the money or the notes is no defense at all.. ."
mand.
414. 2 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 415, at 177 (1969).
415. See, e.g., United States v. Carabbia, 381 F.2d 133, 139 (6th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967).
416. See Deeter v. State, supra note 412, in which the trial judge had made various remarks throughout the trial. The Supreme Court indicated that a trial judge should
limit his comments to the "bare essentials" of rulings and should avoid gratuitous
comments which can lead to prejudice. While the comments were out of place, the
court found that no prejudice resulted.
417. See, e.g., United States v. Guglielmini, 384 F.2d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970).
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eral rule conforms to the United States Supreme Court version of Rule 614 except that the word "court" is substituted
for the word "judge" so that 614(b) reads "[t] he court may
interrogate witnesses . . ." Wyoming copies the federal rule
version. Does this mean jurors as well as the judge may question a witness? The questioning of witnesses by members of
the jury has been allowed in some jurisdictions. 418 The determination whether to let jurors ask questions has been left
to the trial judge's discretion in these jurisdictions. In any
event, jurors are usually reluctant to interrogate a witness and
consequently it is rare that the subject ever reaches appellate
review.419 The adoption of Federal Rule 614 in 1975 and
Wyoming Rule 614 in 1977 may change the discretionary
character of allowing jurors to ask questions to witnesses.
The Advisory Committee's Note to the federal rule refers to
the "judge" as having authority to question witnesses. But, it
nowhere states that jurors are prohibited from asking questions. The rule itself is silent on the issue and has yet to be resolved by judicial opinion. In the past, when courts have defined the term "court" they have defined it to mean both
"judge" and "judge and jury" depending on the way the term
4
was used. 20
Objections
Subdivision (c) of Rule 614 permits counsel to object to
the calling or interrogation of witnesses by the court. Objection may be made at the time of calling or interrogation or at
a later time when the jury is not present. If a later time is utilized, the rule specifies that it must be the "next available opportunity" when the jury is not present. This procedure is designed to relieve counsel of the embarrassment of objecting to
a judge's question in the presence of the jury. 42 It still requires timely objections, though, to afford the opportunity
to employ corrective measures if need be. 422 These features
combine the automatic objection aspect of Wyoming Rule of
418.

419.
420.
421.
422.

WIGMORE . 784(a), at 199-200. For cases that say it is within the discretion of the
trial judge see United States v. Witt, 215 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 887 (1954); Ferrara v. State, 101 So.2d 797, 801 (Fla. 1958); Carter v.
State, 250 Ind. 13, 234 N.E.2d 650 (1968); People v. Justice, 50 Mich. App. 59,
212 N.W.2d 762 (1973); Nelson v. State, 513 S.W.2d 496 (Ark. 1974).
WIGMORE § 784(a), at 199-200. For an excellent annotation on the subject, see
Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 872 (1970).
See 10 WORDS & PHRASES, Court (1968).
FED. R. EvID. 614, Adv. Comm. Note, subdivision (c).
FED. R. EvID. 614, Adv. Comm. Note, subdivision (c).
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Evidence 605 with the provision in Wyoming Rule of Evidence
103 of putting the responsibility for objecting on the parties.
23
RULE 615: EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES

Rule 615 of the recently adopted Wyoming Rules of Evidence codifies the practice of excluding witnesses from the
courtroom while other testimony is being taken. The rule is
justified on the theory that if one witness is excluded while
another witness is testifying, any collusive plan to fabricate
evidence is foiled. 24 Before Rule,615, the decision whether
or not to exclude a witness was left to the discretion of the
trial judge both in Wyoming 42 and at the federal level. 426 Under the new rule of evidence, however, this discretion is eliminated.427
Upon request, the court must order witnesses excluded so
that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses. The
court may, on its own motion, exclude witnesses, also. The
rule is silent on the question of when the request is to be made
and on what instructions, if any, the court may give to the excluded witnesses. A proper instruction for the court to give
might be to tell the witnesses excluded not to discuss the case
with each other.428 In a criminal case, if an instruction is given, it should be worded such that the excluded witnesses are
not left with the impression that they cannot discuss the case
with anyone, because of the possibility that such an instruction could be held to be a deprivation of a defendant-witness'
29
sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
Three categories of persons are excepted from the general
rule of exclusion of witnesses under Rule 615. The first ex423.

RULE 615. EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES
At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they
cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own
motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by

a party to be essential to the presentation of his cause.
424. FED. R. EvID. 615, Adv. Comm. Note; see, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 388 F.2d
786, 788 (9th Cir. 1969).
425. Whiteley v. State, 418 P.2d 164, 167 (Wyo. 1966). In Martinez v. State, 80 Wyo.
325, 342 P.2d 227, 229 (1959), the court stated that the better practice was to exclude the witness at the beginning of the trial.
426. See, e.g.. United States v. Eastwood, 489 F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1973).
427. FED. R. EVID. 615, Adv. Comm. Note.
615 [O], at 615-9, where it is noted that a failure to give such an
428. WEINSTEIN
instruction has not been considered reversible error.
429. United States v. Leighton, 386 U.S. 1025 (1968).
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ception allows a party who is a natural person to remain in
the courtroom. 430 This exception is designed to prevent problems of confrontation and due *process.431 The second exception allows an officer or employee who is the designated representative of a party who is not a natural person, such as a
corporation, to remain in court. The rationale for this exception is the same as the first. A common example of a representative of a non-natural person is a police officer who has
been in charge of an investigation. Such an agent for the government has been allowed to stay in court even though he was
also a witness.14 The third exception allows a person, whose
presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of his cause, to remain in court. It is contemplated that
this exception will allow an agent who handled the transaction
being litigated 3 or an expert needed to advise in the manage43
ment of the suit to remain in court throughout the trial. '
It might be noted that Rule 615 eliminates a judge's discretion in whether he may exclude a witness, but he still has
discretion in whether the witness qualifies under one of the
exceptions to the exclusion rule. The burden of proof has
shifted. Before Rule 615, a party wishing exclusion had to
convince the trial judge to exclude. Now, exclusion will automatically be granted unless the party whose witness is ordered
excluded can convince the judge that the witness falls within
one of the three excepted categories.'The consequences for noncompliance of an exclusion order are not outlined in Rule 615. Contempt has been invoked
under prior practice and may still be used under the rule. 436
Other possible remedies are: permitting comment on the witness' noncompliance in order to reflect on his credibility, refusing to let the witness testify and striking his testimony. 1s
The latter two sanctions are harsh ones and courts have gen430.

The practice in Wyoming before the adoption of Rule 615 seems to have given the
trial judge discretion to exclude all witnesses, including a party witness. See Pixley
v. State, 406 P.2d 662, 668 (Wyo. 1965), and Whiteley v. State, supra note 425.
The first exception to the witness exclusion rule in Rule 615 no longer allows this
practice.

431.

FED. R. EvIn. 615, Adv. Comm. Note.

432.

FED. R. EVID. 615, Adv. Comm. Note; see also FED. R. EVID. 615, Report of Senate Comm. on the Jud.
Such witness also qualifies under the second exception.
FED. R. Evm. 615, Adv. Comm. Note. and Report of Senate Comm. on the Jud.
WEINSTEIN
615 [01],at615-8.
See, e.g., Shoemaker v. K-Mart, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 260, 262 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).

433.
434.
435.
436.

437. WEINSTEIN

615 [01 ],at 615-10.
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erally avoided using them where a party was in no way responsible for the witness' noncompliance. 438

STEVEN M. LEIGH
RICHARD R. WILKING
RICHARD E. HOPPER, JR.

438. See Hollywood v. State, 19 Wyo. 493, 122 P. 588 (1912).
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